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**ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTH-WESTERN  
NIGERIA: THE CASE OF KADUNA STATE**



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**Universiti Utara Malaysia**

**MASTER OF ART (SOCIOLOGY)  
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**ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NORTH WESTERN  
NIGERIA: THE CASE OF KADUNA STATE**



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**A Thesis submitted to the Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government In  
fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Art (Sociology)  
Universiti Utara Malaysia**



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## ABSTRAK

Konflik, khususnya dalam demokrasi, adalah normal dalam batas-batas peraturan demokratik, tetapi apabila ia berterusan dan menjadi amat ganas, sistem sosial memerlukan kajian mendalam bagi menentukan puncanya. Nigeria telah bergelumang dengan krisis etnik agama yang berterusan yang telah mengambil nyawa beribu-ribu orang, menghancurkan harta benda yang tidak ternilai, dan menyebabkan berjuta-juta orang termasuk wanita dan kanak-kanak hilang penempatan. Semua ini mengakibatkan ketidakstabilan demokrasi di negara ini. Konfrontasi kekerasan yang berulang kali dan berterusan dalam kalangan kumpulan etnik di zon geopolitik Barat Utara terutamanya di Kaduna selama lebih daripada satu dekad dan yang tampaknya semakin meningkat terutama dengan pendemokrasian politik memerlukan pemeriksaan kritikal untuk memahami faktor-faktor yang bertanggungjawab terhadap berlakunya kejadian seumpama ini. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk melihat sama ada etnik dan agama memberi kesan terhadap keadilan dan toleransi politik dan sama ada kepelbagaian budaya merupakan satu faktor dalam konfrontasi yang tidak berpenghujung. Kajian ini memilih tiga titik penting dalam metropolis negara-Kaduna, Kafanchan, dan Zangon kataf untuk kajian. Temu bual mendalam dilakukan dengan peserta di tempat kajian. Semua respons telah disusun dan diurus dengan menggunakan perisian Nvivo 11 untuk analisis berikutnya. Tiga penemuan utama telah dijumpai: (a) konflik etnik agama adalah hasil perjuangan kuasa elit yang menafikan keadilan rakyat melalui manipulasi agama dan etnik; (b) manipulasi identiti etnik dan agama oleh ahli politik telah menjadikan kedua-dua komuniti eksklusif dan menyebabkan mereka tidak mempunyai semangat toleransi; dan (c) kepelbagaian budaya digunakan oleh kumpulan etnik untuk menuntut daripada kerajaan agar orang lain dikesampingkan kerana mereka tidak berkongsi pertalian budaya, mengakibatkan penyingkiran sosial dan tentangan ganas oleh kaum terpinggir. Kajian ini menyumbang kepada pemahaman keadilan sosial dan toleransi politik sebagai pemboleh ubah penting dalam pembangunan budaya politik.

**Kata Kunci:** Konflik Etno Agama, Kestabilan Demokrasi, Keadilan Sosial, Toleransi Politik.

## ABSTRACT

Conflicts, especially in a democracy, are normal within the confines of democratic rules, but where they become persistent and especially violent; the social system requires an in-depth study to establish the reasons. Nigeria has been grappling with persistent ethnoreligious crises that have taken the lives of thousands, destroyed an indeterminate value of properties, and displaced millions of people including women and children resulting in democratic instability in the country. The recurrent violent confrontations that have continued unabatedly among ethnic groups in the North Western geopolitical zone particularly Kaduna state for over a decade and that seem to be on the increase especially with the democratization of the polity necessitate a critical examination to fathom the underlying factors responsible for the incident. The study intends to find out whether ethnicity and religion impacts on justice and political tolerance and whether cultural diversity is a factor in the unending confrontations. The research selected three important flashpoints within the state-Kaduna metropolis, Kafanchan, and Zangon kataf for study. In-depth interviews were conducted with participants whose responses were organized and managed using the Nvivo 11 software for subsequent analysis. Three key findings were found: (a) ethnoreligious conflicts are the outcome of an elite power struggle which denies citizens justice through the manipulation of religion and ethnicity; (b) the manipulation of ethnic and religious identities by the politicians has made the two communities exclusive, rendering them intolerant; and (c) that cultural diversity is used by ethnic groups to make demands on government to the exclusion of others with whom they do not share cultural affinity thus promoting social exclusion and violent resistance from the marginalized communities. The study contributes to the understanding of social justice and political tolerance as important variables in the development of political culture.

**Keywords:** Ethnoreligious Conflicts, Democratic Stability, Social Justice, Political Tolerance.



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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to my mother Rabi Muhammad.



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AOAV</b>	Action on Armed violence
<b>UNPF</b>	United Nations Population Funds
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>IDEA</b>	International Democratic and Electoral Assistance
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>OPC</b>	Ooduwa Peoples' Congress
<b>PDP</b>	Peoples Democratic Party
<b>NPC</b>	Northern People's Congress
<b>NCNC</b>	National council of Nigerians and the Cameroons
<b>UMBC</b>	United Middle Belt Congress
<b>AG</b>	Action Group
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>MASSOB</b>	Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign Biafra
<b>NCBWA</b>	National council for British West Africa
<b>NYM</b>	National Youth Council
<b>NNDP</b>	Nigerian National Democratic Party
<b>NIREC</b>	Nigerian Interreligious Council
<b>IPL</b>	International Peace League
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational and Scientific Commission
<b>JAMB</b>	Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board
<b>APC</b>	All Progressives Congress
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>ANPP</b>	All Nigerians Peoples' Party
<b>CPC</b>	Congress for Progressive Change
<b>CAN</b>	Christian Association of Nigeria

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

There has been an explosion of democratic activities in the world in 1990. Communist and authoritarian regimes have been crumbling in the face of people's resistance and rebellion. Nepal, Zaire, Mongolia, Burma, and Albania, countries reckoned to be the worlds most isolated have joined the ferment. The post-communist Eastern Europe, the Latin American post-bureaucratic authoritarian states, the rich industrializing East Asia and even tropical African nations are democratizing. The unprecedented scale at which independent nations are demanding, installing or practicing democracy has never been witnessed. The wide and rapid spread of awareness of the struggles for popular democracy has been tremendous (Diamond, 1990). However, the freedom of speech, freedom of religion and association known with democratic regimes and the weakening of military's hold on political power have resulted in a rise in ethnoreligious sentiments in Nigeria. (Ojie, 2006).

This ethnic sectarianism which weakens democratic stability leads to undesirable schisms of interests which put democratic politics in jeopardy. Democracy is an administrative system which primarily addresses common concerns. The state is a

common pool to which every citizen has a stake. It focuses on shared interests of the people as a common cause. (Ojie, 2006). But the democratic project in Nigeria seems to be accompanied by a debilitating ethnic and religious strife which is antithetical to democratic ideals. In a Democracy, there must be conflict but within the confines of democratic rules.

For over three decades Nigeria has been a battleground of conflict with political undertone but ethnic and religious in manifestation. This has been more recurrent in the Northern part of Nigeria. These conflicts are taking frightening dimension, taking into account the destruction of lives and properties of indeterminable value and number. According to Radda (2007) conflict among people and in all societies, is normal and there may never be a conflict free society. Mead believes conflict is positive especially where it leads to the redesign of social situations. He argues that such a redesign of society is influenced by the minds of individuals in conflict and this initiate a development of the social whole (Mead, 1938).

However, social scientists, more especially sociologists are concerned with where and when conflicts become widespread, recurrent and violent resulting in the loss of lives and property. Ethnicity which is mostly associated with plural societies like Nigeria promotes solidarity or common identity, which arises as a result of a struggle against other groups considered to be hostile ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1980). So while most conflicts in other African countries are partly caused by borders, conflicts in Nigeria are essentially internal, and while most conflicts in Arab Africa are religious, for instance, Egypt and Algeria, the worst conflicts in black Africa are ethnic; so called (a tribal), for instance, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda (Mazrui, 2001), the

Sudan ethnocentrism, ethnonationalism which led to protracted violence and socio-political conflicts until the partition of north and south Sudan and the central African republic ethnoreligious carnage (Nwankwo, 2015). Therefore, black against black conflict in Africa is a clash of identities and by implication, tribal wars are ultimately cultural. With the democratization of Nigerian society instead of cohesion and abridgment of the ethnic divides, the society is further drifting to an ethnic conflict-ridden society.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Nigeria is a blend of rival ethnic groups pitted against each other in a struggle for political power and economic resources which manifest in the political processes. It has long shown the trappings of a failed state but it still hangs at the precipice. The question of a suitable coexisting arrangement has been contentious (Duruji, 2010). Democracy seems to be the natural option for a multi-ethnic state like Nigeria to ensure peaceful coexistence among its people. Despite democratization, though, Nigeria is still a conflict-ridden society. Ethnicity and its mobilization in the pursuit of political interest, which is believed to be responsible for democratic instability, has been a resurging topic of discourse as stated by Stavenhagen:

The growing concern about the connection between armed struggle typical of the one emanating from the political manipulation of ethnicity and statutory and political restructuring is understandable, considering the global resurgence of the ethnic question as part of the process of globalization. Ethnic groups have joined the fray in the struggle for autonomy, recognition, and equity from a hitherto coexisting political community. (Stavenhagen, 1996: 1).



This scenario seems to reflect what obtains in Kaduna state. Violent and bloody conflicts have accompanied ethnic groups' quest for recognition, equality or self-determination in North-western Nigeria and specifically Kaduna state. The state has been a theater of numerous ethnoreligious upheavals with dire consequences. On account of these conflicts, democratic ideals have been compromised.

The North-Western Nigeria has been relatively uneventful except for the Kano 1981 Maitatsine riot which was an intra-religious crisis, the Kafanchan 1987 Muslim/Christian students conflict which ignited religious identity divide in northwestern Nigeria (Ukiwo,2003; Okpanachi, 2012; Angerbrandt, 2015; Dakyen and Zungdet, 2014) Subsequent conflicts generated mostly by trivial issues continued to claim more lives and destroy properties at each occasion (Dakyen & Zungdet, 2014; Aleyomi, 2012). Such conflicts could flare up anywhere anytime taking innocent citizens unawares. Interpersonal issues that could be settled without rancor would degenerate to a full blown inter-ethnic strife that would claim hundreds, sometimes thousands of lives and property and seriously undermine the security and stability of the northwestern hemisphere. The scale has reached a level that is unheard of in other parts of Nigeria, except the recent Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria.

The North West and specifically Kaduna state has the highest frequency of bloody conflicts (Action on Armed Violence, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2003). The Hausa/Fulani Muslim majority have led the state since its creation to the consternation of the Christian minority ethnic groups (Action on Armed Violence AOA, 2013; Angerbrandt, 2015). The politico-economic competition heightened

tension in the state which sometimes escalated to violence. The tense situation has so permeated the state, that, respondents decline to answer questions broaching the issue of ethnoreligious conflicts, owing to the volatility of the subject (AOAV, 2013). In the year 2000, an ethnoreligious riot over the reintroduction of sharia in the state claimed 1,295 lives official figure, while people interviewed by the human rights watch claimed it was closer to five thousand (Suberu, 2012; Aleyomi, 2012). This figure represents only that of February 2000. In March the same year, another clash took place the number of casualties conflicting. In 1992 land dispute between the indigenous Kataf and the Hausa/Fulani resulted in the death of over 1000 lives and by November 2002 there was yet another crisis which claimed more lives, property and displaced hundreds of people. (AOAV, 2013).

The above may not be unconnected with issues bordering on social justice, power relations and marginalization of one group by another which leads to political intolerance and recurrent violence (Gurr, 2000). Larry diamond also says mid-level democracies in developing states of Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe, will actually lose steam in the medium to long run except if they scale down their very high levels of poverty, inequity, and social injustice and embark on systematic economic reforms for sustainable growth (Diamond, 1994 & 1995).

This perhaps prompted the recent scholarly interest in Nigerian democracy which directed attention into issues of ethnoreligious conflicts relative to democratic stability include: "Religion, ethnicity and Citizenship; "Ethno-religious identity and conflict in Northern Nigeria; "Ethno-religious conflicts and citizenship question; "Regional identities and ethnoreligious conflicts in Kaduna; "Ethnic minorities and

political turbulence in Kaduna state; “Ethno-religious conflicts the citizenship question”; “Ethno-religious conflicts a threat to Nigeria’s federalism”; “The challenges to ethnonationalism: case studies in identity politics”; (Angerbrandt, 2015; Okpanachi, 2012; Suberu, 2012; Dakyen and Zungdet, 2014; Aleyomi, 2012; Duruji, 2011; Joseph, 2014; Ojie, 2006), but what has not been adequately addressed is the influence of ethnoreligious hostilities on democratic stability.

A lot of literature in conflict management projects democracy as the solution to ethnic conflicts (Ake, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Leith & Solomon, 2001; Nnoli, 1995; Osaghae, 1998). The liberal and accommodating nature of democratic regimes makes it conducive for the development of a tolerant atmosphere that encourages negotiations and conciliations (Mousseau, 2001:550). The question is; are the democratic institutions not well grounded to facilitate negotiations and conciliations? Are the democratic values not ingrained in the populace? Or are there any ethnocultural factors militating against the smooth running of the political process. The study examines the impact of justice and political tolerance in the state as the elements that could explain the emergence of hostilities among the citizens.

Justice in a broad sense denotes the fair allocation of resources and benefits to as many members of society as is realizable, Opotow (2011). A number of studies associate justice to affirmative actions such as system support (Tyler, 1990) positive attitude towards authorities (Moorman, 1991; Organ & Moorman, 1993) and readiness to sustain group authorities (Tyler & DeGoey, 1994). Social injustice, on the other hand, is the difference between what obtains and what should be (Cahn, 1949). Studies on injustice see it as an invitation to sabotage, fraud and at group level

promote the disposition to rebel and protest (Greenberg, 1990; Moore, 1978; Muller & Jukam, 1983). The behavior of people in any social setting, as such, is dependent on the judgments of people pertaining to justice and injustice.

Democracy promotes stability in society, if one wants to look at the micro-foundations of democracy; one should look first to values which have more direct linkage to democratic stability, not their remote antecedents. Political tolerance as suggested by researchers is perhaps the most important component of democratic beliefs, and system support, as attitudes most directly linked to democratic stability (Seligson, 2000). So when people are disposed to accept what they would ordinarily reject, they are tolerant. Politically tolerance is the readiness of a people to accommodate differing political opinions and interests. A different political view only serves to enrich the political process especially in a plural society (Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus, 1979).

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The driving motive behind this study is the desire to find an explanation on why Kaduna state is so prone to ethnoreligious conflicts despite democratization which was essentially floated to enhance peaceful coexistence among citizens. The study views it from the perspective of the influence of social justice, political tolerance and cultural diversity on ethno- religious conflicts.

The research questions include:

Does the absence of social justice encourage ethno-religious conflicts?

Is ethno-religious conflict a result of political intolerance?

Could ethno-religious conflicts be linked to the historical antecedents and cultural diversity of the people?

#### **1.4 Research Aim And Individual Objectives**

The broad aim of the research is to find out whether ethnoreligious conflicts are the result of injustice, political intolerance and cultural diversity.

While the individual objectives are to:

Determine whether ethno-religious conflicts are the outcome of injustice.

Identify whether ethno-religious conflicts are triggered by political intolerance.

Explore the influence of historical antecedents and cultural diversity of the people on ethno-religious conflicts.

#### **1.5 Research Paradigm**

The constructivist worldview or social construction of reality as it is known came from Berger and Luckman (1969), Lincoln and Guba's (1985) naturalistic theory (Creswell, 2015). Lincoln et al (2011), Mertens (2010) and Crotty (1998) among others are however the more recent writers who have summarized this position. (Creswell, 2015).

The constructivist worldview expounds the following assumptions as identified by Crotty. First, human beings tend to read varied meanings to social reality in the course of daily interactions with others. To tap on these varied meanings qualitative researchers use open-ended questions which allow participants to express their multiple takes on their context.


Second, the historical and social perspectives of humans shape their worldview. In other words, the historical antecedents and culture of humans dictate their attitude to social reality. Qualitative research tends to adopt the social setting of the participants in order to come to grasp with their context and secure information personally. Understanding the context of the people combined with the sense people make out of their social reality assists the researcher to interpret findings which are guided by the researchers' experiences and background.

Third, human social interaction forms the basis of generating meaning. From the data collected in the field, the researcher generates meaning through the process of inductive reasoning. The research is to a large extent driven by the participants' subjective interpretation of their experiences. Adopting the constructivist paradigm, the research is expected to generate information from the participants by administering broad and general questions so that participants can construct a definition of the situation. These subjective meanings obtained from the participants, which are often the product of social interactions and historical antecedents, would help in gaining a deeper understanding of the contextual problem of the conflicting groups (Crotty, 1998).

## **1.6 Conceptual Framework**

The research intends to use a qualitative case study to address the influence of ethnoreligious conflicts on democratic stability. Stake (1995) believe qualitative case study is a design used in many fields where researcher designs an in-depth analysis of a case within a timeframe collecting detailed information through a number of data collection methods over some time.





*Figure 1. 1 Conceptual framework for the study*

To organize the conceptual framework of this study, three elements representing democratic values are adopted from the studies of (Seligson, 2000; Fraser, 1998). These elements are 'justice, political tolerance and cultural diversity.

In the ensuing struggle for relative group worth, conflict is generated. The general assumption is that the colonial regime has created an advanced and backward group in the society which affects the self-esteem of some groups since group influence is central to individual identity. (Horowitz, 1985). This generates an uncordial relationship which affects political tolerance. Elite manipulation and the activities of religious organizations scuttle justice by interfering with the socio-political processes on behalf of their members. Faleti (2006) argues that conflicts are used mainly to inflict injuries, neutralize or subvert the aspirations of opponents. Despite the secular status of Nigeria, religion is still pervasive. It can be used through religious fanatics to execute war in just the way ethnicity is in conflict. While religion can help to

develop a sense of solidarity, it's sometimes uncompromising stance can easily lead to intolerance, discrimination and violent action (Agbiboa, 2013).

Falola (1998) maintains that the struggle to sustain religious dominance over others has shaped the political opinion of many Nigerians. This often leads to political mobilization of adherents of Islam and Christianity in Mosques and Churches. Politicization of religion appears to be a natural outcome of a multi-religious society, once religion is politicized they become exclusive political parties whose members may never adhere to nor respect the outcome of normal democratic processes (Awoniyi, 2013). The occasional violent confrontations between the religious adherents over time have been telling on political tolerance. This in effect puts democratic stability in jeopardy (Ibrahim, 1991; Williams & Faiola, 1995).

In all the various confrontations, lives are lost, properties destroyed, people displaced, life chances cut short, basic rights and liberties compromised. To the extent that none of this is recompensed by the government, justice which is the correction of wrongs and injuries has been compromised. The whole thing about democracy is the guarantee of constitutional rights when these are not guaranteed the stability of democracy is threatened.

### **1.7 Significance of The Study**

Many scholars have been on the field studying ethnoreligious conflicts; however, the impact of this recurrent phenomenon on Nigeria's democratic stability has not caught so much attention. Following this, therefore, the study is of theoretical importance because Nigerian polity is replete with all forms of conflicts. Any study concerning

the depth understanding of the causes of conflict especially with a political bearing would be a positive contribution. In view of government's reservation on research in the conflict in Nigeria owing to its sensitivity, the findings of this research will enrich literature which has been constrained.

### **1.8 Scope of The Study**

This study will focus on the divergent ethnic groups in the Northwestern part of Nigeria with specific reference to Kaduna state. The northwestern part of Nigeria is made up of seven states which are Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi. Among the seven, Kaduna has a unique ethnic configuration. While the other six states have an overwhelming Hausa/Fulani Muslim population, Kaduna has an almost 2:3 ratio with about 30 percent of the population from Kaduna south constituting the ethnic minority Christians, 68.6 percent Hausa/Fulani Muslim majority and 1.4 percent to the others (Suleiman, 2011).

Nigeria covers about 923,777 square km which is about 3% of Africa's landscape, positioned between latitude 40 degrees and 140 degrees north of equator and longitudes 30 degrees and 140 degrees east of Greenwich Meridian. It is located entirely within the tropical zone. The 2006 national population census reports Nigeria has 140 million people, which is estimated to 177 million in 2015 by the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2015). The 2006 population census indicates 3.2% annual population growth which was pruned down to 2.8% 1975-2005 and 2.2% 2005-2015; United Nations Population Fund (UNPF). The Economic Intelligence Unit (2010) reports that; GDP per capita is \$2,385 (at purchasing power parity). Paden (2008), marvels at the political resilience of Nigeria, in spite of its ethnolinguistic and

religious diversity. He argues that Nigeria presents a unique model of interreligious political accommodation with a near equal population of Muslims and Christians.

The six ecological zones in the country lie between the swampy coastal rainforest of the south and the semi- arid fertile grasslands of the north. The land areas are made up of high grounds of the average height of 1500m, over the eastern region, 600m over the northern region and 300m over the western region. The coastland of the southern region is a low-lying area above sea level and is characterized by creeks and lagoons on both sides of the Niger Delta. Nigeria is bounded by the Benin Republic on the west (773 km) and Cameroon (1690 km) to the east, the Gulf of Guinea (Atlantic Ocean) to the south, Chad republic (87 km) and Niger republic (1497 km) to the north Adewale (2011).

Nigeria is blessed with very rich and diverse plant and animal life. There are four broad vegetation belts. The mangrove swamps in the coastal region, the rain forest, the woodland savannah in the middle belt and the Guinea and Sudan savannah in the north. The climatic profile has the rainy season (April-October) when the moisture-laden south-westerly winds blow from the coast bringing rains, and the dry season (November-March) with dry dust loaded easterly winds wafting across the country. Climate varies between (Equatorial/tropical from the coast to the inland and semi -- arid from the inland to the borders of the Sahara). The general temperature is high except in places like Jos plateau, Mambila plateau and Ogbudu plateau where the temperature is relatively cool all year round.

The multi-ethnic, multi-lingual nature of Nigeria makes it an intricate, heterogeneous and plural society with over 270 ethnic nationalities. The Yoruba language is spoken in the southwestern Nigeria, Igbo in the southeast, Hausa/ Fulani and Kanuri in the north with several other minority tribes and languages throughout the country. With its human and natural resource profile, Nigeria appears quite intimidating even to its neighbors. With a population figure of 177 million people and an array of natural resources like; natural gas, crude oil, columbite, bitumen, iron ore coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, gold, kaolin, talc, silica, granite, gemstone, tantalite and arable land, Nigeria has a great economic potential.

### **1.9 Operational Definition of Terms**

Ethnicity explains a group's idea of who they are or how they are perceived by others to be different from others with regards to distinct features in the society. Groups distinguish themselves on the basis of cultural diversity. People are identified by their cultural traits. Ethnicity becomes salient when there is competition for scarce resources, political contest or cooperation. (Osaghae, 1995; Nnoli, 1978; Egwu, 1999).

Ethnicity is a concept that explains the possession of a common feature or characteristic which, though ascribed, is nonetheless used as an effective rallying point for the attainment of primordial interests, especially in competition with others for scarce resources.

## **Religion**

Connelly (1946) sees religion as things to do with the sacred and the spiritual. He asserts that religion came about in an attempt to organize beliefs, feelings, and the human actions which happen while responding to various deities as sacred and the spiritual. Religion keeps men always captivated by established symbols that keep men in perpetual motivation. (Geertz, 1966; Peter, 1998; Ayinla, 2003). It is an organized system of faith, that, adherents believe in the existence of a particular God or gods with a complete system of regulations and standards of behavior governing their conducts.

## **Democracy**

Democratic governance is a system that is associated with the exercise of power and authority by the people and that there is a regular change of government through free and fair elections as a process that is institutionalized (Sithole, 1994).

## **Ethno-Religious Conflicts**

By ethnoreligious conflict refers to the confrontations that ensue between one ethnic or religious group and another in a plural society. It is a relationship that is best described as uncordial, characterized by mutual suspicion and constant fear in an environment that is prone to violence. Salawu (2010).

## **Democratic Values**

Values can be described as “the measurement of importance attached to an object, event or phenomena” (Seligson, 2008). It is a guiding principle of individual and social life (Schwartz, 2013). Values could also mean respect for human rights,



tolerance, pluralism, compromise, freedom, equality, openness, participation, free discussion, freedom of expression, avoiding violence and these could also mean democratic values (Kisali, Erdogan and Tali, as cited in Seligson, 2014). For the purpose of this study 'justice and tolerance' represent democratic values.

### **Political Tolerance**

This denotes the respect people have for the political rights of others even though they may differ in political thoughts. A level playing field is maintained where citizens adhere strictly to the democratic processes; maintain constitutional provisions and the political will to apply the rule of law. Democratic stability is maintained through political tolerance (Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus, 1979).

### **Justice**

It is a moral value that accords every individual equal possibility for the realization of one's aspirations. To define the concept of justice, Fraser divided it into two paradigms; the paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of recognition. The former is rooted in political economy, for instance, exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation, while the latter is based on social patterns of representation and interpretation e.g. cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect. (Fraser, 1998).

### **Injustice**

This is the difference between what obtains and what ought to be. Cahn (as cited in Opatow, 2011) describes social injustice as "an emotionally laden construct provoking the outrage, horror, shock, resentment and anger that prepare the human

animal to resist attack”. Social injustice perceived to have been ill-motivated can move groups into taking actions which may include violence and war in order to call to order a certain perceived wrong.

#### **1.10 Summary of Chapter**

This chapter introduced the topic by highlighting the background of the subject under study. The problem statement was clearly explained followed by the succinct enumeration of the research questions and the general and specific objectives of the research. Attempts were also made to state in clear terms the significance of the research in terms of theoretical and practical contributions. The scope which gave the demographic and geographical features of the study area were featured.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The preponderance of literature on the subject of ethnoreligious conflicts in northern Nigeria makes it a pervasive discourse. Scholars and pundits have variously commented on the rising level of violent conflicts in recent times. According to Ukiwo (2003), the return to civil rule has seen the escalation of more violent conflicts among ethnic and religious groups throughout the country. Therefore, a synoptic review of some journal articles will be made to highlight positions taken by various scholars in an attempt to understand reasons for the recurrence and escalation of conflicts in a democratic dispensation.

#### **2.2 The Concept Of Democracy**

Democracy as a concept describes a pattern of political organization and participation relative to modes of economic organization. In other words, the social system reflects the nature of political organization, e.g. Socialist, capitalist etc. Democratic principles cannot thrive on undemocratic soil (Ahire, 1997). Thus a free and egalitarian political system cannot develop from negative and exploitative social relations. He concludes that democracy cannot be nurtured spatially in terms of the political dynamics of the east or west. Neither should it be viewed ostensibly in terms of periodic rituals of holding elections to select political actors. Rather it should be

conceived as the process of justifying socio-political and economic affairs of human communities.

The commonest definition of democracy is- a type of government in class society representing in reality or fiction, the supremacy of many over the few through the mechanism of the state. Bako (1997) discredits this view and argues that democracy is rather the totality of social relations and a system of social values. He states further that, essentially democracy creates an atmosphere that is conducive for individuals to realize their potentials to the fullest. The underdevelopment of Nigeria he argues is a reflection of the failure of democracy. For the west to achieve democracy in the form of vibrant and dynamic capitalism, they had developed certain institutional mechanisms like the competitive party system, impartial electoral system, representative institutions, independent judiciary, free press and free elections. With these on the ground, the individuals and groups are at liberty to set their mechanism for realizing their potentials.

Even though there is no evidence depicting the fact that social and political problems can be effectively solved in a democracy relative to other political systems, it still maintains and even increases its indispensability. It is more accommodative of rights and freedoms (Erdogan, Kisali as cited in Seligson 2014). In more developed societies, it is not only a political administration but a lifestyle that entails values belonging to rights and freedoms.

Seligson (2000) Writing on political culture and democratic stability in Central America highlighted the skepticism of scholars on the stability of democracy as a

political system. Democracy is in its third wave as posited by Huntington. What prospects are there for the stability of the current cycle?

Przeworski et al (1996) studied 135 countries from 1950 to 1990 and concluded that countries with a 1985 per capita GNP of more than \$6,000, democracies do not breakdown, thus alluding economic strength to the stability of democracy. Lipset acknowledged the importance of Przeworski's findings; yet, he recognized the essence of cultural variables like legitimacy and argues that they could be important for the endurance of democracy once they are institutionalized. To underscore the relevance of political culture Lipset went on to highlight further, the shortcoming of the Przeworski findings in his work "political stability in democratic systems". The Przeworski study is a structural measurement of variables which downplays the relevance of political culture. Democratic stability may not entirely depend on democratic values but it does play a significant role. The exclusion of information from the primary level, therefore, particularly political culture leaves the polity without direction. Seligson continues to argue despite the volume of recent research in political culture, researchers ignore the question of democratic stability. The paper addressed the question of micro-foundation of stable democracy and the values that have proximity to democratic stability.

Seligson refers to political tolerance as the respect citizens have for the political rights of others particularly those with whom they may not share the same opinion. Gibson (1992) views those who perceive constraints on their freedom as living in communities associated with high level of political intolerance. In the setting of societies transiting to democracy the repercussion of such finding is apparent. One

would expect that the limited freedom known with newly democratic nations would feature intolerant political culture generated by micro-level or individual level political intolerance.

Many studies have been conducted to measure political tolerance by determining the level at which individuals are willing to grant civil liberties to some groups. For a system to remain democratic, tolerance is desirable, so that, civil liberties are guaranteed (particularly to minorities). Developing democracies with a desirable level of tolerance are likely to witness a deepening of democracy. When system support is high, but with low tolerance, the system remains stable (on account of high support) but democracy is jeopardized. Conversely, where the system witnesses low support and low tolerance, democracy becomes vulnerable, because of imminent democratic breakdown. Following the argument by (Dahl, 1971) that the survival of polities witnessing severe ethnic conflicts depends on the belief system of the populace, a number of empirical researches conducted have focused on political tolerance as the crucial belief required for the stability of democratic systems (Seligson & Caspi, 1983)

These projections were made taking into account the theoretical effect of the connection between legitimacy and political tolerance. Attainment of the predictions is not certain, due to a number of factors, particularly the local factors noted by Przeworski and his colleagues, in addition to foreign influences, will strongly impact on the long-term consolidation, erosion or inertia of democracy in each country.

The paper concludes by advancing the effect of political culture on projecting democratic stability and suggests that some political systems have a better chance of endurance than others. It is pertinent at this juncture to bring in the Macro-level factors as earlier suggested in another study. It was clearly pointed out that by the second half of the 1970s; the necessary minimum conditions for the survival of democracy have even been surpassed. The economic, as well as social development index, was high, yet the region was embroiled in civil war and revolutions at that very moment. Political culture may have been the missing link from the equation.

Going by Przeworski's findings, based on GNP alone, Panama's democracy should last as long as Costa Rica's; when political culture data are factored in, however, the two countries diverge and conform much more closely to conventional wisdom differentiating them. The increasing availability of survey research data world-wide urges us to carefully examine political culture as a factor that may help us understand the prospects for democratic stability. (Seligson & Caspi, 1983).

Tianjian Shi, (2008) in a paper titled, China: Democratic values supporting an Authoritarian system has written on the socialist brand of democracy. It is described to be more advanced than bourgeois democracy because it serves the majority of the people while at the same time checking those who would exploit others or destabilize the state (enemies of the people). The ruling party under the socialist democracy listens to the people (mass line) and refer specialized cases to experts, but the liberal democratic style of the contest for power or separation of powers is not espoused as they are the tools used by the bourgeoisie to delude the people (Mao, 1949). Shi concludes that there are two concepts of democracy in China, the populist and the



liberal. In most of the democratic principles, people are divided. For instance, on the rule of law, a sizable percentage are of the view that government should disregard the law in addressing difficult situations while others believe in due process. Similarly, in deciding important cases a significant percentage believes judges should be guided by the executive. Results also showed that the population was divided on whether the leader should accomplish his goal even if he has to ignore constraints on him by the legislature.

The ever-growing support for democratic values in China is not pointing to the likelihood of transiting to liberal democracy. Contrarily, it shows that a high level of popular support can be sustained for an authoritarian regime even as the economic forces of modernization and cultural globalization bring increasing public support for the abstract idea of democracy. Reasons adduced to this position are that the regime has defined democracy in its own terms using ideas of a good government deeply rooted in the nation's historical culture and more recently in its socialist ideology. Second, the regime enjoys support from the public perception that it has accomplished more than the previous regime in both political and economic realm. Third, the enduring norms of hierarchy and collectivism lend support to trust in political institutions.

The paper gave a cursory look at consociation democracy which is defined as a fairly complex system of constitutional engineering where elites appreciate the volatile threats of dominant political groups in polities where political culture is deeply divided or where society is split by sharp cleavages. Such leaders build institutions and enact policies to stabilize democracy by limiting certain forms of democratic

contests. (Lemarchand, 2007) Countries associated with consociation democracies include Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland in Europe and Malaysia in southeast Asia, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa. Each operates according to its peculiarities.

The system has four defining characteristics which include:

A grand coalition cabinet: This involves the elite of the opposition and majority parties, cooperating in sharing executive powers. Political groups follow the division of a religious, regional, linguistic, cultural, racial or ethnic nature. The second is group autonomy: Decision making is a joint exercise by all participants of the coalition cabinet; other issues are left to the autonomous units. Thirdly, the principle of Proportionality: To guarantee minorities' fair representation, public service appointments, political representation, and funds allocation are on a proportionate basis and fourthly, Minority veto: This is used sparingly only on matters of critical importance to protect minority vital interest. (Lemarchand, 2007; Southall, 1983).

### **2.3 Democratic Stability**

Democracy alone does not guarantee stability in a plural society. The basis of democratic stability is that what maintains government and assures stability is voluntary support or consent of the citizens and not the recourse to the use of force. But government must occasionally use force to control dissidents. In fact, a government without the support of coercive instruments is rarely effective. Cassinelli (1961) says even if the government has to use force, it should have the moral right to do so. These democratic elements of stability were well summed up by Diamond, Lipset, and Linz (1987) thus:

It is a condition where elections and the change of governments at regular intervals have become normative because of the conviction of the citizens (elites and masses) that democracy is the best system of government. For democracy to be stable it entails that, a people have a government in place which they chose and that, as sensible beings, the most likely government they support is that which protect, represent and pursues their interest.

While democratic instability on the other hand depicts a situation where unlawful take-over of government, removal of elected officials, bureaucratic and political corruption which includes; ballot stuffing, rigging, manipulation of electoral registers, cancellation of votes, inflation of electoral votes, vote buying and overturning of electoral results is prevalent (Ogundiya, 2010). This portends a serious setback to democratic stability.

Weffort (as cited in Lipset 1994) argues that "even if political equality among citizens is attainable in groups having a prevalence of economic inequity, the incongruity between economic and political inequity prepares grounds for pressures, official twists, instability, and endemic violence and may plunge democratic dynamics into inertia. This negates a situation where the government has wide ranging powers to organize the lives of its people and the source of this wide-ranging power is legitimacy. State commands compliance when the citizens perceive it to be pursuing their interests and the common good. In other words, obedience to the state depends on the peoples' ability to relate to the state as their own. Obedience to the state can hardly be guaranteed as long as the majority perceives the state to be acting in the interest of a particular class or a few people, no matter who is at the helm of

affairs. As long as the state is perceived to be an opportunistic contraption whose structure is in the service of private interest, it is unlikely to garner support except in utilitarian (patron- client terms).

Osaghae (1995) following this lead emphasizes the critical role of the citizens in the stability calculus. He downplays the concept of political stability against democratic stability. The latter which adopts a descending approach and sees stability from the viewpoint of orderly (even if not essentially good or democratic) government, the former from an ascending perspective sees it as dependent on the level of consent enjoyed by the government. The operators of state machinery must, therefore, be seen to be in the pursuit of common good, it enhances their credibility and compels voluntary obedience. He also argues that the amoral sphere under which the politicians operate is at the center of democratic instability in Africa and especially Nigeria where state operators abuse their positions in the pursuit of private ends. Amoral familism is an impediment to stable democracy. Young (1988) “suggests that amorality of the public realm is the failure to import the state apparatus along with their moral milieu from Europe”.

Legitimacy is a self-imposed obligation on the part of the citizens to obey their government whether it is the monarchical, totalitarian or democratic government. It depends on the recognition accorded to the source of authority (Lijphart, 1977). But what does it take for a government to be legitimate, since minority groups don't seem to recognize the legitimacy of governments that do not work towards their interests' for instance, Nigeria in 2015? The general elections were adjudged to be the most widely acclaimed, yet a segment of the population is threatening to secede because of

some primordial interests. Such secessionist threats seriously undermine the stability of any democratic regime.

Nigeria has diversity (ethnic, religious and cultural) which needs profound measures to integrate the diverse elements. National integration denotes the unity of a people with divergent interests. D'souza (1997) defines national integration as the awareness of common identity among the citizens of a country; in other words, placing loyalty to the country above group and sectarian interests. Jega (as cited in Edewor et al, 2014) sees national integration as a condition which depicts a disparate group of people cohabiting in a community which shares common historical values and experiences devoid of any social cleavages. Attempts have been made in Nigeria on several occasions to float programs and strategies to integrate the society with minimal achievement Edewor et al (2014).

The belief and commitments of national leaders to national integration is mere rhetoric when it comes to real politics the garb of nationalism is dropped and the pursuit of ethnoreligious, regional and even sectarian agendas are on. They create a split between groups by whipping up sentiments in order to serve their political interests. It is evident that there is a connection between the failure of the leaders' efforts at national integration and socio-economic instability (Edewor, et al 2014). He further explains that the opening up of political space through democratization has afforded the ethnoreligious jingoists the opportunity to push the idea of resource control, self-determination, and change in socio-political arrangement. Duruji (2010) believes the intervention of the military into the political arena for a long time has suppressed the manifestation of ethnic cleavages. In 1999 the return to democracy



came with it an avalanche of ethnic- national grievances which spewed up issues the democratic institutions could not contain. It has seriously threatened the country's nascent democracy. Nzongola-ntalaja (1999) believes the activities of ethnic militia stems from among other things the inability of the state to monopolize the possession of instruments of violence, lack of security, law and order. A reasonable level of cohesion is desirable and even necessary for a nation to achieve its national objectives, but developing nations seem to be lacking in this cohesion as most countries transiting to democracy often face instability especially plural societies like Nigeria.

For a democracy to be stable greater percentage of the people have to support the eligibility of democracy to rule, the set of people in government have to be credible as well as a competitive party system, impartial electoral system, representative institutions, independent judiciary, free press, freedom of information laws, open political institutions and transparently conducted elections (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2003). Hollyer, et al (2014) sums up the above in 'transparency'. He maintains that democratic rule stabilizes as long as political actors adhere to the rule of the game. Equilibrium is maintained in transparent polities where transparent elections solve the problem of selection of political actors. This reduces the chances of mass mobilization to remove underperforming governments. These parameters are in essence the measures of democratic stability anywhere, which are rare in nascent democracies like Nigeria, as depicted by the characteristic ethnic-regional squabbles between the various interests which project the nature of politics in Nigeria; as such democratic instability becomes inherent.

## 2.4 An Overview Of Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a concept that explains the characteristics associated with a group's socio-biology i.e. Primordial groups characteristics. Scholars argue that it is an ascribed status. One does not choose to which clan he is born, as such ethnicity is something given. It is more or less fixed and permanent (Isajiw, 1992). While the primordial group gives ethnicity a genetic basis, other scholars see it as a tool by which groups manipulate socio-political arrangements in order to achieve their desired material objectives. As such it is not fixed, it is fluid. It all depends on what is at stake (Glazer and Morbihan, 1975; Rothschild, 1986). The primordial group may be right, ethnicity is ascribed, but in Nigeria, it is turned into a tool that is wielded to achieve primordial interests which make the second school of thought right as well.

In line with the above, ethnicity tends to be understood as, the canvassing of support through ethnic identity or differences to edge others out in a competition or conflict and to gain an advantage in cooperation (Osaghae, 1995). By this, therefore, members of an ethnic group share identity and affinal ties on the basis of common territory, linguistic and cultural similarity and common ancestry. Distinctions among people occur based on these differentiating factors and which guides the actions of people. (Osaghae, 1995). Nnoli (1978) says ethnicity recurs where ethnic relations are competitive rather than cooperative. Scholars have credited ethnic conflicts to a number of factors that include: a] "emotional power of primordial givens or cultural ties b] struggle for relative group worth. C] mass based resource competition. D] Electoral mobilization e] elite manipulation. F] False consciousness and g] defective political institutions or inequitable state policies" (Doombos, 1991; Horowitz, 1985;

Osaghae, 1995; Suberu, 1996). Agbiboa (2013) conceive of ethnicity as an instrument that is used to mobilize and successfully capture political power, resources, and political relevance.

Moving on to religion in which (Adeniyi as cited in Aleyomi, 2012) explains as guiding principles of conduct, standards by which man worships his deity. By implication, religion has an established standard which structure and organizes the life of adherents. I.e. emanated from God and which must be followed by the believers.

The concept of God or gods is central to religious beliefs. The faithful believe in the existence of a God or gods worthy of worship. According to Egwu (2001), religion could be given the material and spiritual interpretation. First, in a material sense, it could mean religious establishments (institutions and officials) including social groups and movements who are chiefly concerned with religious activities. In another sense, individual and social behavior is organized according to the tenets of the religion. The spiritual sense has to do with man's relationship to the supernatural being.

Agbiboa (2013) opines that religion is another identity toga that some authors have argued can be used instrumentally to execute war in much the same way as others have analyzed the instrumental role of ethnicity in conflict. Religion then becomes a tool wielded by groups to attain certain objectives. As a preamble, the modern social theory postulates that secularization as a procedure invariably comes before modernization. It was mostly seen as an end result of modernity and as a catalyst to it

(Agbibo, 2011; Casanova, 1994; Haynes, 2007). Religion must, therefore, give way to secularism for societies to modernize. With the development of logical thinking, the growth of capitalism and the advancement of science-religion will cease to have any influence on the life of people (Marx & Weber). However, Huntington (1996) thought differently, he argues that religion is today a powerful institution that states and societies wield to influence the turn of events. Berger (1993) argues that the world is not seeing the decline of religion; instead, it is even gaining a fresh momentum. Rapid modernization is believed to have caused the destabilization of people in the developing nations psychologically and has disorganized them culturally.

Religious identity driven conflicts have the character of being among the most uncontrollable, because of the uncompromising stance of their adherents on religious ideals. While adherence to belief systems can help to develop a sense of belonging and purpose, it can easily lead to intolerance, discrimination and violent actions. Most religious conflicts emanate from non-religious causes; they are not about religion or religious conversion. It only supplies the unifying and mobilizing identity (Seul, 1999) as noted in Agbibo (2013) "Religion is not the cause of religious conflict; rather for many it frequently supplies the fault line along which intergroup identity and resource competition occurs."

## **2.5 Endemic Nature of Conflicts**

Nigeria was colonized by Britain from 1861-1960. For about a century it has witnessed repressive, exploitative and quite disturbing incidents of marginalization and suppression of groups by the so-called majority groups within the polity. This

was promoted by the colonial regime by subjecting the minority groups to the hegemonic control of the larger groups. This has generated hatred among the various ethnic groups. Ethnicity problems of Nigeria could be traced to the 1914 amalgamation which put multiple ethnic groups together for administrative purposes without consenting them. Akinyemi (2001) points out that Nigeria is created by the British ignoring a large number of complexes and competing nationalities. The British put the otherwise disparate groups into one political entity to further its economic and political goals. (Okafor, 1997). The system of administration applied pitted the three major tribes in the struggle to occupy the strategic political position for easy access to the resources of state (Agbiboa, 2013). The ethnic-regional and religious structure were taken into cognizance in the process of planning and executing all developmental policies and programs which favored the indigenous administration system. This marked the genesis of the regional, economic and political imbalances (Jega, 2000).

The selective treatment of ethnic groups according to their influence is what eventually led to intense competition. There was a wide disparity in educational achievement as well as a political and economic gap lopsided in favor of southern Nigeria. The dominance of the major ethnic groups in the newly created regions worsened the intense competition for supremacy as the minority groups who were subsumed under the majority ethnic groups struggled for inclusion or autonomy. (Osaghae, 1991; Suberu, 1996). Agbiboa, further explains that the coalition of the three majority ethnic groups – Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba- to make up about two-thirds of the national population does not undermine the numerical strength and political importance of some of the so-called minority groups as parts of the political

economy. In addition, the insistent demands of the minority for political inclusion and their tenacious hold on their political space which denies the majority groups the political terrain for their exclusive political struggles, both deepens and confounds the attempts to find national identity in Nigeria.

Suberu (1996) argues that minority problems are deeply entrenched in complicated historical and structural processes of pre-colonial and colonial immersion and consolidation of diverse ethnic segments, federal territorial development and restructuring, revenue allocation, and political struggle and representation. The forcible integration of the northern region despite the glaring differences was an attempt by the British to cobble up a relationship between the middle belt and the Hausa/Fulani which according to Tyoden (1993) is that of "subordination, oppression, and exploitation; in other words, sub-imperialism". The British had to use the Sokoto caliphate because then it was the only effective and centralized political system. As such enormous political power was transferred to the Fulani, for effective administration under indirect rule system (Kastfelt, 1994). The middle belt, therefore, woke up to the political domination of the Fulani aided by the British through the military and political intercession.

The problem of ethnic cleavages is not peculiar to Nigeria; it is one of the intractable problems faced by many polities. Intense hostilities and tension abound in states with such cleavages (Seligson and Caspi, 1983). Countries transiting to democracy are confronted with severe problems while trying to cope with ethnic cleavages. One of the major problems is the basic norm of majority rule and the right of minority (Dahl, 1971). Under the arrangement, the majorities always have their way and the



minorities lose. So while trying to maintain one democratic procedure (rule of the majority) within the framework of ethnic conflict other normative rules are violated thereby risking democratic rule (Seligson and Caspi, 1983). It was argued by (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972) in the theory of democratic instability, that, where there is a clear definition of an opposing group there is the likelihood of intra-communal consensus and intercommunal conflict.

### **2.5.1 The Ethno-Regional Conflicts**

Throughout the nation, there are flashpoints of conflict for myriads of reasons. The Yoruba, Hausa/Fulani clashes in Sagamu and Lagos between OPC and Hausa trader/settlers which led to bloody reprisals in Kano were mostly hinged on control of economic activities, the annulment of June 12; 1993 elections by IBB, the repression of NADECO (an ethnic pressure group) by Abacha, and the incarceration of senior military officers of Yoruba extraction, the perceived northern military establishment is seen to be executing an ethnic agenda. In order to pacify the Afenifere, (a pan-Yoruba cultural organization), the AD a pan-Yoruba political party was registered even without fulfilling conditions. The north (Hausa/Fulani) eventually conceded power to the southwest (Yoruba) electing Obasanjo who was later seen to be marginalizing the Hausa/Fulani because he was trying to find a political base in his geopolitical zone. Following this, prominent northern politicians rallied and mobilized the Hausa/Fulani against him. Ukiwo (2003) believes that perceived loss of power could explain the recurrence of ethnopolitical conflicts. On the other hand, the conflict between Hausa/Fulani and Igbo is believed to be a settlement of scores. This is in view of the fact that, the first military coup in Nigeria which saw the demise of the most prominent and respected politicians in the north

was organized and executed by top ranking Igbo military officers coupled with the fact that the Igbo threatened to dislodge the Hausa/Fulani hegemony by carrying out their threat to secede Ukiwo (2003).

### 2.5.2 The Ethno-religious Conflicts

Ethnoreligious conflict refers to the confrontations that ensue between one ethnic or religious group and another in a plural society. It is a relationship that is best described as uncordial, characterized by mutual suspicion and constant fear in an environment that is prone to violence. Salawu (2010).

Due to the plural nature of Nigeria in terms of ethnicity and religion, multiple nationalist demands in the form of autonomous political units, self-determination, religious dominance and cultural recognition triggers intense competition leading to differentiation and discrimination between ethnic and religious groups. (Salawu, 2010)

The preceding is an ethnopolitical affair. The next most volatile issue that promotes conflict in Nigeria is the issue of the introduction of the Islamic legal system (*Shari'a*). The bone of contention is the belief of the Christians that, it is a ploy to Islamise the country and that *Shari'a* is going to apply to non-Muslims. This is despite assurances that it will only apply to Muslims. The stance of the governors of the *Shari'a* compliant states was to revert to the penal code. This was later reversed by the Zamfara state governor who said *Shari'a* criminal law is going to apply to Christians as well (International Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2000:85; Agbiboa, 2013). The ensuing struggle between the Christians and the

Muslims accounted for 10,000 people killed in violence colored by religious undertones (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012) in (Agbiboa, 2013). The attempt to implement Sharia and the vehement resistance by the non-Muslims against the imposition of the system has aggravated the tension between the two religious groups. (The news 3:7:2001). The bloody conflict in February 2000 in Kaduna was also a result of a demonstration against the Kaduna state house of assembly's plan to pass the Shari 'a bill. Reprisals followed in some southern cities e.g. Aba, Onitsha, and Uyo because a sizable percentage of Igbo and Ibibio tribesmen affected by the crises were resident in Kaduna. This city has seen a number of communal strife each with dire consequences.

In 1980/81 there was the Kasuwan magani conflict, the Gure/Kahugu 1984 conflict and the 1986 Lere riots, (Kazah toure, 2003). The major which claimed lives which run into hundreds and sometimes thousands as the human rights watch report indicate are the 1987, Kafanchan riots, which involved students from different ethnic and religious communities, twice in 1992, February and May in Zangon kataf over relocation of market, February and May 2000 Sharia conflict and the November 2002 riots over *Shari 'a* (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

*Shari 'a* in Kaduna rekindled the age long animosity among the peoples of the area who have borne the history of resistance to Hausa/Fulani domination. In the wake of this conflict, many non-Muslims residing in the northern cities moved to Jos, a neutral ground, which culminated in the September 2001 bloody conflict. The appointment of a Muslim Hausa to the position of coordinator poverty alleviation

program of the federal government in plateau state was said to have sparked the riots (Ukiwo, 2003).

Partly because of their tendency to spill over from their initial theaters into other localities, states, or even regions of the federation, ethnoreligious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of the inter-group crisis in Nigeria. They have occurred mainly in the Middle-Belt and cultural borderline states of the Muslim north, where Muslim Hausa-Fulani groups have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups in a “dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities [in which it] is often difficult to differentiate between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin” (IDEA 2000: 296).

A number of incidences have occurred in the middle belt since 1999 between Hausa/Fulani and other ethnic groups in the area. The Tiv/Azare conflict in Nassarawa state in June 2000 over Tiv political domination, the Tiv/Jukun conflict of October 2001 over control of land, the Tiv domination in Taraba and numerous skirmishes between the Tiv and Fulani cattle herders over grazing land (Alubo, 2002:9-11).

The Islamic identity by its all-embracing nature fades other identities into obscurity and ethnic diversity is sometimes intensified by religious differences. The instrumental role of Islam in the establishment of the northern emirates in the early 19th century is reflected and the enduring role emirs and religious organizations played in carving out identities in the northern states (Lewis, 2007). Abubakre (1984) says the political ideology of Muslims in any Islamic society derives from the

Islamic way of life which is governed by the Islamic custom and traditions. He equally asserts that earthly governments merely represent the theocratic control of God's physical and spiritual world. The entwined relation between religion and social life as such generates deep distrust when it is understood that one religious group directs the governmental activities of the country (Agbibo, 2013). It is on this premise that religion becomes a tool by which secular authority is checked especially where it fails in its statutory responsibility. The struggle to maintain religious dominance over others has shaped the political opinion of many Nigerians (Falola, 1998).

Before 1960 the Islamic Maliki law was strictly applied in the Qadi courts in most of northern Nigeria though the British have curbed the criminal Shari'a law which they felt was obnoxious (Ostein, 2007). This followed various agitations by the minority groups for the British to look into their plight as far as the Sharia is concerned. The Willinck commission was set up to investigate the fears of the minority tribes in the north which was responsible for the enactment of the penal code laws in the region after the establishment of a Sharia court of appeal in Kaduna. (Kukah, 2003) thus expunging some aspects of Sharia which led to some confusion in the status of the Shari'a law. This signaled the beginning of the process of the deconstruction of Sharia in the north (Kenny, 1996). This was in order to foreclose the prospect of applying Sharia on non-Muslims. In the heat of the debate for the reintroduction of Sharia in Kaduna, a constitutional lawyer representing the Islamic religious body Mahmud opines that: The fundamental rights of the Muslim begin with divine rights, which can only be accomplished with the provision of Sharia to govern their lives. Before independence, the government of northern Nigeria was coaxed to pass penal

code law and certain laws for criminal procedure in order to administer criminal justice for Muslims and non-Muslims. The Muslims were dissatisfied since the government did not implement an important recommendation of the panel charged with the responsibility of reorganizing the laws of criminal justice which say in effect:

Since Muslims constitute the majority of people living in the region, it requires therefore that the new criminal justice system or penal code to be adopted were not in any way in conflict with the provisions and injunctions of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah (Shari'a) (Ostein, 2007). The Sharia was eventually supplanted with the penal code in order to protect minority rights.

## **2.6 State Response To Ethnic Conflicts**

The government has at best been reactive. Armed forces deployment, site visitation, the promise of relief materials, non-committal vow to prosecute perpetrators and the inevitable panels to find out the causes of conflict and recommend ways to prevent future occurrence which invariably ends there (Alubo, 2002). Proactive measures have become necessary. Even within government circles, there are self-serving primordial interests. Issues were deliberately suppressed using military diktat, as such with democratization; aggrieved parties are afforded the freedom to revisit issues voicing their discontent which sometimes lead to violent conflicts (Ikelegbe, 2005, Ukiwo, 2003).

Sequel to every conflict a commission of inquiry is set to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the conflict and assess the extent of damage caused. In 2007 and 2009 such commissions headed by General Sabo and Tanko. Similarly in 1994, 2001

and 2009 Plateau state government set up such commissions headed by Justice Aribiton Fiberesima, Justice Niki Tobi, and Justice Bola Ajibola also following inter-ethnic strife. Sometimes states commissions operated concurrently with the committees set up by the federal government after the Kaduna, Plateau and the 2011 post-election mayhem. In 2001, 2009, 2010, and 2011, Justice Suleiman Galadima, Emmanuel Abisoye, Chief Solomon Lar and Sheikh Ahmed Lemu headed various presidential advisory committees. (Emelonye & Buergenthal, 2011). All the committees have duly submitted their reports to government, but the implementation of the reports has somehow met with setbacks thought to be political. This shows government lacks the political will to check the crises.

The projected change under democratic dispensation became a mirage which led to the operations of the tribal militia to press home their demands, this is in spite of the hoax Government orders to arrest and try anyone who parades himself as OPC and the police order to also shoot anyone who resists arrest (Barnaby, 2000). In spite of the ban, proscription, repression and arrests the militia continue to exist, (plateau, Benue and Niger Delta militia) if anything, it has further brought the militia into a violent confrontation with the state (Ikelegbe, 2005). This is because State policy has been reactive rather than proactive. It focuses on the clashing and the rioting rather than the social and political issues that sustain the militia (Maier, 2000). Democratic freedom has also been overstretched and misconstrued as freedom to do anything without restraint (Osadolor, 2002; Ukiwo, 2003; & Akinyele, 2000).



## **2.7 Nature Of State**

### **2.7.1 The Political History of Nigeria**

The paper while tracing the history of Nigeria it depicts it as a symbol of an African state which experiences intermittent conflicts of various nature and dimensions due to inadequacies in programs and policies that promote security. The study is of the opinion that Nigeria is an amalgam of strange bedfellows that should not have been cobbled together.

After Nigeria's independence in 1960 disunity and lack of commitment to cohabit began to manifest among political elites. The fall of the first republic could be traced to a number of events, one of which was the political imbroglio of southwestern Nigeria, the genesis of which was the imprisonment of the erstwhile opposition leader Chief Awolowo on account of attempted coup, the central government's lack of support from the south, mutual suspicion among the major ethnic groups, party allegiance along ethnic and regional lines among others. Since then the incongruity of the various political interests manifested. Series of conflicts of high magnitude were recorded. The 1967-1970 civil wars claimed more than a million lives and millions' worth of property destroyed besides the immense suffering endured by innocent victims of political miscalculation. After the civil war, Nigeria came into enormous oil wealth which was grossly underutilized. The Gowon military regime was overthrown for lack of vision, corruption, and penchant for a perpetual hold on power.

The Successor to Gowon General Murtala Muhammed was murdered in a bloody coup which brought the former president Obasanjo to power under the military. He

successfully handed over power to the civilian government of Shehu Shagari which was eventually overthrown by another military coup for corruption, mismanagement of resources, and general non-performance. This coup brought General Muhammadu Buhari to power under the military. He was ousted in a palace coup by General Babangida. A subsequent change of governments also followed almost the same pattern up to 1999. The political instability witnessed in Nigeria brought the most serious threat to domestic peace- the Niger Delta youth restiveness, the ethnoreligious conflicts in the north, the communal clashes over land across the country and a number of religious insurgencies in the north.

The return to civil rule did not mitigate the crises if anything; the crises took a more disturbing turn. With the exit of Obasanjo 1999-2007, Umar Yar'adua did a brief stint in which he resolved the problem of the Niger-Delta youth unrest by floating the amnesty program which halted the youth militancy in the region and peace returned to the creeks.

President Jonathan took over after the death of Yar'adua and completed the first tenure. He flouted the party's (PDP) rotational principle and contested the 2011 general elections amidst tension. He won the election over a heated polity. The security situation worsened amidst dismal performance. A number of bomb attacks were successfully executed in Abuja the capital city including the national police headquarters and the United Nations office. While the transition debacle was going on, a terrorist organization known as *jama'atu ahlissunnah hidda'awati was-jihad* otherwise known as (Boko Haram) was wreaking havoc in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Like any terrorist organization, they hold fanatically to a particular ideology

or opinion (political or religious). Their activities metamorphosed from verbal criticism of the existing situation in the country to organized attacks on soft targets- markets, churches, mosques, schools and other public domains especially when their leader Mohammed Yusuf was extra-judicially executed and televised by the security forces. 2009 -2015 saw the escalation of their heinous activities. The Facts on Nigeria (2014) has the following record of deaths connected to Boko Haram; 2009, (830) 2010, (920) 2011, (1427) 2012, (1386) and 2013, (2050).

In view of the above, the state seems to have been unstable under the spell of the political class. The preceding account of state/ethnic relations, regional power competition, interreligious, interethnic conflicts all boil down to who controls government machinery and its resources, hence the need for a political system which ensures equal access to power structures for equal participation in governance. Countries that are beset by minority agitations, secession attempts, and violent conflicts have come up with various systems of government that are politically accommodating. These systems limit the majoritarian tendency and promote inclusion, equity and a balanced distribution of value among the constituent groups. This arrangement notwithstanding many societies remains barely stable (Rabushka and Shepsle as cited in Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

The above aptly depicts the situation in Nigeria today. The unabatingly territorial or state legitimacy issues hamper attempts at national integration, democratic stability, and economic development. (Dudely, 1973; Kirkgreen, 1971; Maier, 2000; Melson and Wolpe 1970; Post and Vickers, 1973; Soyinka, 1997). Osaghae and Suberu (2005) citing the example of plural countries that enjoy relative peace like

Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia, and Tanzania argue that ethnic plurality is not a necessary prelude to conflict. Owing to its complex nature, Nigeria which has seen so much conflict envisaged to be responsible for its political and economic underdevelopment recently adopts a democratic political system which it is believed would resolve the contentious issues.

Suleiman (2011) in a paper titled: Democracy and the struggle for identity and independence by non-Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria, 1999-2011, addressed the travails of democracy in a community haunted by its past and intimidated by its present. The issue though seems to have a national outlook.

Nigeria he says has a chequered history. It has come through various challenges which border on national integration and political stability. Its few democratic experiments were botched by military coups and challenged by ethnic and communal crises. This depicts the general outlay of socio-political environment in Nigeria. The study focuses on southern Kaduna and its struggle for new identity and independence in the context of democratic dispensation 1999-2011.

The research took a historical approach and used memos from the southern Kaduna people. Southern Kaduna is believed to have been inhabited by migrants between 16th-18th centuries. The people, though different, shared certain characteristics in Language and culture. They were a stateless society made up of independent groups of between 300- 100,000 in pre-colonial times Yahaya (1980:15).

Muslim Community in Southern Kaduna (Jema'a Emirate) were Hausa/Fulani who formed a cohesive union easily because of their common religion, culture, and their historical interaction over time. Though evidently, later arrivals in the area, the Fulani who created the Jema'a Emirate in 1810 were attracted to the southern Kaduna for its rich vegetation and conducive environment for grazing around the 17th century. Jema'a conquered the non-Muslim ethnic groups such as Kaje, Kegoro, Yeskwa, Ayu, Sanga and Ninzam. It was the most organized, politically oriented community in the area. Zazzau and Jema'a did not make any attempts to integrate the non-Muslim communities into the largely Muslim culture Yahaya (1980). Antagonistic communities were occasionally raided and made the source of slaves, farm produce and industrial products sent to Zazzau as tributes. This made the relationship hostile.

The Hausa, on the other hand, were long distance traders' en-route southern Kaduna. They established Zangon Kataf as transit (Yakubu, 1999:5). Some began to settle down and the town began to prosper. Kauru emirate was established as another vassal state of Zazzau, the Hausa henceforth became the link of the communities to the outside world (Garba, 1992:5). Hausa became widely spoken in the area, as such when the Christian missionaries came, Hausa language was used to spread the gospel (Ashafa, 1991). The non-Muslim groups began to convert to Christianity as a mark of protest against Islam (Kukah, 1999). This gave them a world outlook, dignity, new identity and western education. Kukah (1999) believes the missionaries and colonialism promoted antagonism. The disparate ethnic groups were brought under the emirate system since they had no organized political system. This attempt was resisted and was met with brutal suppression by the colonial powers.

Under the indirect rule system, the native authority was headed by the traditional rulers who were mainly the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. The emirate and its structure symbolized colonialism because tax assessment and collection, effecting colonial policies and administration of forced labor became the responsibility of the Muslims in the non-Muslim areas.

The Northern Nigeria non-Muslim league elites created a platform in 1949 in southern Kaduna to struggle against the Hausa/Fulani domination. It grew into a political association in 1950 as Middle Zone League. It was formed to fight against forced labor and other colonial exploitation by the native authority. Their major demand was the participation of non-Muslims in the Native Authority administration. Opposition declined and tension was snuffed out when the elites were placed in the Native Authority.

“Indigenous village heads were among those who adopted the mannerisms, lifestyle and the general respect for sarauta that could be easily identified with the Hausa/Fulani village head. Even the educated elites were socialized into accepting the superior organizational competence of the Hausa/Fulani” (Yahaya, 1980; Yakubu, 1999). These same class of people also formed part of the northern Nigeria civil service under Ahmadu Bello (Sardauna) the then Premier of Northern Nigeria. Their struggle was persistent up to 1987 through; the use of youth and political associations, petitions to tribunals, panels of the investigation, government agencies, churches, and various other fora to sensitize the public on their plight against Hausa/Fulani domination.

On all occasions, the Hausa/Fulani were the victims as it all happened in southern Kaduna except the Sharia which permeated the whole state. This was envisaged to be the cumulative effect of structural adjustment program under president Babangida which deepened poverty, unemployment and economic hardship became more unbearable. Ironically President Abacha's was worse and there were no such crises in his tenure.

Secondly, frustrated, idle and poverty stricken in addition to a poor pension of serving and retired military personnel who were in the majority in southern Kaduna could have induced violence. Major general Zamani Lekwot was deeply involved in the 1992 Zangon Kataf crises in which 1,536 were murdered and property worth 30 million Naira were destroyed and thousand more displaced. He was found guilty and sentenced to death but the sentence was commuted to a prison term by the Ibrahim Babangida administration.

### **Demands of The Non-Muslims**

While the southern Kaduna elites are struggling for emancipation from the emirate system, they are on the other hand agitating for the creation of chiefdoms/territories whose domains will be established largely by ethnic and religious factors, with non-Muslim elites as chiefs to govern their people at the local level. In short satisfying their second demand even though the whole traditional political institutions have no place or role in Nigeria's constitution and local government structure (Joseph, 1987).

Frequent erosion of powers of the traditional political institutions has disempowered them. Going by the 1979-1999 Nigerian constitutions and the 1976 local government



reforms all traditional local authorities who have any traceable or non-traceable antecedents or foundation no longer had any constitutional role in government at all levels, yet the southern Kaduna elites are struggling for power, relevance and influence through these moribund institutions.

In 2000 Governor Makarfi created 22 chiefdoms, 217 districts in southern Kaduna in line with ethnic boundaries, but that did not decentralize power but rather satisfied relevance seeking elite group who induce ethnic and religious agitations for change in an already transformed political and social environment.

### **Democracy in Nigeria 1999-2011**

The fourth republic 1999- 2011 is the longest in democratic experiment after Nigeria's long sojourned military interregnum from 1966-1999. What has continued to make and mar governments throughout the world is the question of legitimacy which is found in the little measure in Nigeria (Joseph, 1987). Corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigerian society right from the time it was institutionalized by the Babangida regime 1985-1993 (Jega, 2002). Politics became the fastest way to wealth by personal aggrandizement or what is known as corruption and abuse of office (Tamuno, 2003). This denied the people the gains of democracy which made people susceptible to mobilization, manipulation, and violence as self-help measures (Jega, 2002). The federal character principle created to promote national integration has made the issue of indigeneship, land, and ethnicity very sensitive (Gboyega, 1989). It promotes politics of exclusion, unhealthy competition, rivalry and violence among communities.

The Hausa/Fulani Muslims are considered settlers in southern Kaduna, as they are denied indigeneship even though some of them have been there for more than 300 years (Suleiman, 2011). The question is where the tribes were when the Jemaa emirate was created about 200 years ago. While the southern Kaduna ethnic groups struggle to exclude the Hausa/Fulani from political and economic resources of the area, they struggle against political, economic, and social domination by the Hausa/Fulani at the state level where they constitute a minority. Since democracy is a question of numbers they are always reduced to playing second fiddle-deputy governor- even that is for political expediency.

Following the death of President Yar'adua, Jonathan became president and the then governor of Kaduna state was selected as his deputy which guaranteed the ascension of his deputy from Kaduna south to the position of governor. A scenario of apprehension was created. The southern Kaduna elites want their son to be elected at least for once in the 2011 general elections, and considering the antecedents, the Hausa/Fulani minority in southern Kaduna resolved to vote the opposition party, a decision that whipped up sentiments and led to the 2011 post- election violence. As always the Hausa/Fulani minority in southern Kaduna were at the receiving end. Hundreds died and thousands displaced.

In its conclusions, the paper posited that mutual interactions existed in trade and social relations in a pre-colonial era even as periodic tensions came to pass at the political level over competition for power and control of natural resources. Colonialism brought Christianity and western education which altered the balance of power, the irony, though, is that the non-Muslim groups are now agitating for the

same administrative system they reject and denounce as symbols of domination. They have adopted the Sarauta system in its entirety, which symbolizes the Hausa/Fulani they accuse of marginalization and repression. On account of a new found identity they now want to drive people out of their domains.

The creation of chiefdoms in southern Kaduna may have doused tensions, but the thorny issue of southern Kaduna minority remains to be solved. It is a national question that will continue to generate tension not only in Kaduna but in other parts of the country with a similar problem.

Ike et al (2014) writes in a paper titled: Reflections on state security and violence in Africa. The topical issue of state security and how it impacts on the proliferation of violent scenes in Africa which affects the general wellbeing of Africans is addressed.

Africa's development was truncated by colonialism and its imposed system. The political travails of post-colonial Africa- Authoritarian, divisive, exclusive politics are rooted in the incursion of the Europeans into the African pre-colonial political organizations which subjected the African political economy to its service. The security and development of the African state, therefore, is subjected to the whims of their masters.

Security and development are two parts of the same coin; they carry the same weight and meaning. "State security can be seen as national security which is referred to as the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic, diplomatic, power projection and political power" (free encyclopedia, 2003). State

security encompasses a broad range of facets, all of which have a bearing on the non-military or economic security of the nation and the values adopted by the national society. Apparently, state security entails the possession of economic, energy, political, human and environmental and social security among others. Violence, on the other hand, is generally defined as having the intention to harm or damage something (Encarta Dictionary, 2009/10).

Post-colonial African states have come through a variety of conflicts- political and electioneering, socio-economic agitations, ethnoreligious crises, cultism, ethnic militias, terrorism, boundary disputes, organized crimes which collectively and individually compromise security and stagnate development of the continent. The nation state is an entity which is recognized to have sovereign rights over a particular territory which it can legitimately use military might to protect. As such it is the custodian of legitimate instruments of coercion (Ebuley, 1995). Legitimate use of force goes along with political legitimacy and this is rooted in the ability to effectively provide security to citizens- provision of basic necessities (food, Shelter, energy and medicine) necessary for physical and national security. Failure in this respect leads to social instability. The Boko Haram/ Niger Delta youth restiveness, South Sudan crises, Central African Republic religious conflicts, Somalia Al-Shabab insurgency, The Mali cessations' attempts by the Tuaregs and the Rwandan genocide to mention a few are serious security concerns that could send strong signals to potential investors about the non-viability of venturing into Africa.

Apart from social provisioning, the issue of social cohesion among constituent groups is very important. Therefore, groups making up a country must be and must

feel part of the political process of the state. Political exclusion is a recipe for social unrest which affects social stability through the escalation of violence. The paper analyses the subject from the Marxist post-colonial state-theoretical perspective. The assumptions were that: Post-colonial states are purely instruments of class domination; that domestic foreign powers collude in primitive accumulation; and that Post-colonial states are rentier states partitioned out in patron-client chains to those who use state power for selfish ends.

Following the same cue, Miliband (1977:109) argues that the state as the major means of production is the source from which domestic and foreign forces accumulate economic power. Ake in the same vein believes the economic factor provides the pivotal axis on which all other socio-political processes are hinged, even though all the social structures are interdependent but the character of the social system is determined by the economic structure (Ake, 1981:3-4).

The neo-colonial states get embroiled in a struggle between contending classes in the society which it is supposed to moderate. It becomes the instrument by which the domination and exploitation of the subjects are perpetrated (Ekekwe, as cited in Ezeibe, 2013).

According to Biodun and Aliyu (2011), the quality of life of a people in a state is the measure of its national security. The level at which the state addresses issues pertaining to poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, human rights abuse, hunger, ethnoreligious crises, ill-health, the safety of persons and property, projects how secure that state is. The lackluster attitude of state to the above is a

recipe for multiple conflagrations. Easy access to firearms has compounded the problem. The Niger Delta militants can access firearms through neighboring Cameroon and Gabon from war-torn areas like Angola, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast (Amaraegbu, 2011). The collusion between state officials and well-placed oil cartels in oil bunkering is apparent. (Coventry, 2009). He further explains that government's permissive attitude has made corruption endemic in the oil sector. Officials of state and security operatives work in tandem to subvert the effective enforcement of the law to curtail militancy and terrorism in Africa.

Olaiya, (2014) in a paper titled: Youth and Ethnic Movements and their Impacts on Party politics in ECOWAS examines the role of youths in the struggle for independence, their significant support in the course of democratization, and their place in the variety of conflicts taking place within the African continent and Nigeria in particular. Despite their role in decolonization, the youth have received less than commensurate attention. While parties in developed democracies are seen as agents of political socialization and leadership, parties in West Africa are built on ethnoreligious foundations. The marginalization of youth in politics and decision making thus becomes evident. The youth take it out on the system by constituting themselves into 'foot soldiers' of ethnic militias and terror groups creating increased social problems in Africa.

Political parties should serve as agents of political socialization which help to entrench democratic principles and practices by which effective governance and dispensing of the much-touted democracy dividends is ensured. For effective discharge of this role, a mechanism is necessary for the effective regulation of

political parties (Akande, 2000). Except in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, cote d'Ivoire who have been engulfed by civil war and Guinea, Mali and Togo who experienced political stalemate motivated by crises of political succession, all West African countries have gone through one form of political contest or other. The paper intends to establish whether the ethnoreligious violence dominated by the youths was not an outcome of the unemployment of 70% of youth in the sub-region. In Nigeria, the involvement of youths in ethnoreligious clashes has assumed renewed public concern since the return to civilian rule in 1999.

### **The Dialectics of African Politics and the Youths**

Wolin (1960:2-3) "asserts that one of the essential qualities of what is political, and one that has powerfully shaped the view of the political theorists about their subject matter is public". Considering the statistical significance of youth in the African population, the idea of the public as an area where all interests are effectively addressed has completely eluded African political space. Despite the significance of youth in the African population, the concept of youth has no stable definition (Olaiya, 2014) not to talk of addressing their problems.

Political parties in Nigeria create the position of youth leaders which are invariably occupied by persons above the age of fifty. Duruji (2010) for instance refutes the postulation by Adejumobi (2001) that ethnic organizations in Nigeria which include the Oodua people's congress (OPC) and Movement for the Actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) are youth based. Duruji (2010) pointed out that if the youth is fifteen to thirty years, only 25% of MASSOB are youths, 75% are in their late 40s and 50s. The same applies to (OPC) which has 43% youths and 57%



adults. This uncertainty beclouds the understanding of the root cause of youth violence (Olaiya, 2012). The youth can hardly be pinned down to any age category or status. Sometimes they are at the center of events, other times at the periphery, sometimes disempowered agents, other times unfortunate victims.

A cursory look at most constitutions in Africa shows how marginalized the youth are. Apart from the 1992 Cape Verde constitution which gave the youth a whole chapter, there is a general neglect of the youth by African states. Olaiya (2012) points out that recent interests in youth within African studies is attributable to factors such as the demographic significance of youths, the consistent economic decline in several African states which adversely impacted on the social mobility of youths and their involvement in violent activities. Burgess and Burton (2010: 2-3) also opine that interest in youths is to a large extent from the interrogations of Africa's demographic imbalance which is reckoned to be responsible for the socio-economic and political problems. Youth crisis which is akin to growing urbanization, massive underemployment, juvenile delinquency, communal socio/political violence must be embraced.

The Changing involvement of "Youths" in Early and contemporary politics Prior to the independence of most West African states, the most prominent and active nationalists and politicians averaged 50 years. The organizer of the African congress and a cofounder of (National Council for British West Africa, NCBWA) W. E. B. Dubois was 51. The Gold coast foremost nationalist case Hayford was 64 when the first congress was convened in Paris, February 1919. Nkrumah and Awolowo represented Africa in the 4th congress 1945 at 46. J G Vaughan was 56 when he

formed the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM) in 1936. H.O. Davies formed the Nigeria people's 'congress in 1951 at 57. Herbert Macaulay formed the first Nigerian political party NNDP in 1923 at 50. This goes to show how alien the concept of youth is to early politics in West Africa.

It is easy to understand, especially for those who follow events in West Africa that the problem of youth is central to understanding the underlying forces of social and political change. (Richard, 2008). "Besides, on a broad note, youths have become central and strategic to the making and unmaking of social and political order in Africa since the start of the millennium as the developments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, cote d'Ivoire, the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan to mention a few of the recent flashpoints in Africa indicate". (Nwachukwu, 2008; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Sesay, Ukeje, Aina and Odebiyi, 2003).

A large percentage of youth in West Africa are underemployed, unemployed and unskilled. As such, they have failed to play any constructive role in contemporary African politics, where they do; it is usually as foot soldiers, thugs and bouncers or carry out other uncivil duties (Olaiya, 2014). They are mostly able-bodied young men armed and positioned by party leaders to incite or counter violence.

The young people are generally crowded out of the political process, with only a few creative avenues left to socialize them into responsible politicians (Stark, 1958). The next alternative is to opt for the poorly regulated informal sector, where eventual involvement in social upheavals becomes likely. Most civil strife and civil wars have seen the massive participation of unemployed youths; therefore, to ignore the youth

and their problems is a recipe for guaranteed political instability and insecurity of the West African states. Duruji (2010) argues, that political parties maintain youth wing of the parties as bodyguards who are daily engaged in brawls with opposition parties in order to maintain a foothold in the political process. The youth wing of the parties ceases to function as soon as the elections are over. Their experience in the political process tends to change them into some form of an organized militia, intent on maintaining their lifestyle acquired when the going was good. Their objective now changes to defending ethnic geopolitical interest. (Adebanwi, 2002).

### **Colonialism, Ethnic Politics and Political Space for youth in West Africa**

There is so much literature on the historical involvement of the colonial powers in African politics and the metamorphosis of the post-colonial polities into more complex political systems evidently a marked difference from the pre-colonial and colonial times. (Boon and Eyong, 2005; Burgess and Burton, 2011; Ekeh, 1975). "The divide and rule policy of the colonial masters in no small measure influenced the effective control of the administration which affected inter-ethnic relations and political activities after independence". This culminated in discord and unhealthy competition among ethnic groups in Nigeria (Ekeh, 1975). Duruji (2010) argues that, in spite of the transition from colonial to the post-colonial regime, the expected transformation was unnoticed because the colonial masters had engrained ethnic colorations in public policies. However, the formidable problem is not ethnicity but the way and manner it is mobilized by the political elite (Diamond, 1988; O saghae, 1995; Otite, 1975). It is also in the discourse that, the influence of an ethnic group in the political arena depends on the groups' access to state power. This recognition induces the local elites to mobilize support for their selfish and primordial interest.

Failure to access power motivates the mobilization of collective non-violent action which scales up unabatedly towards militancy and violence (Ukeje & Adebamwi, 2006:2-4).

### **Democratization, Party Politics and The West African Youths**

Many West African states have democratized with some semblance of a multi-party system, but the big question is, how have dividends of democracy trickled down to every stratum of society including the youth. This has not been forthcoming, as such, the trends are signaling the danger of reversal. Guinea military takes over and President Tandja's attempt to change the constitution to stay in power is dangerous attempts to reverse the democratization drive (Burgess & Burton, 2010).

Looking at democratic process in Nigeria today, there seems to be no practical provision which will guarantee the involvement of youths in political activities. Internal democracy is one key element within the political process which will guarantee youth participation in political activities. But the party stalwarts (money bags) emasculate the political processes.

The study concludes stating that youth can hardly secure the political space to exert any influence. The only political resource the youth have is a number which is not enough to induce any fundamental change in the area of power and economic control.

Meagher, (2010) in a paper titled: Informality, religious conflict, and governance in Northern Nigeria: Economic inclusion in divided societies, studied the informal

economies of Kano and Kaduna states. In the study, she refutes the argument which states that religious diversity is a driver of conflict. She looks at the informal economy of the two states, focusing specifically on motorcycle taxis, tire dealers, tailors, butchers and pepper soup producers representing other informal economic actors. The study brings to light the complimentary and competitive relationship between peoples from the religiously divided community. It assesses the role played by informal institutions like the trade unions, and the formal interventions, such as taxation, in defusing or aggravating conflict at the grass root level.

It is reckoned that 65% of the non-agric labor force is employed by the informal sector which gets nothing from the state and gives little in return. The enlistment of the informal activities, their access to state resources and the issue of taxation are the key components linking the state and the informal associations. These various components will be looked into in order to analyze the potentialities of informal economies acting as retardants or catalysts to conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Duffield, 2001; Reno, 2000 are of the view that large informal economies and religiously diverse societies are violence prone. Reno (2006:37) points out that informal economy ties the exercise of political power to violent exploitation in informal and secretive markets. The significant contribution of the informal economies in cementing relationships among communities and their developmental role in West Africa should not be easily forgotten.

Economic historians have documented the role of Islam in bridging ethnic divides and providing a framework for economic cooperation and trade across northern Nigeria and West Africa more broadly (Austen, 1987; Curtin, 1995; Lovejoy, 1980).

The legendary efficiency of the Mouride, Hausa and Igbo trading networks in West Africa demonstrate the role of religion in strengthening the cross-ethnic network of trust and solidarity and new ethics of production and accumulation (Meagher, 2009; Cruise O'Brien, 1975; Meagher, 2010). To understand these complexities require deeper attention to the impact of religious diversity and to the institutional characteristics that can foster peace as well as the conflict in religiously plural societies.

In spite of the seeming lack of cordiality between the two religious communities, there is some level of cooperation and interdependence prevailing between their informal actors across all activities. An Igbo tire dealer, (interviewed in Sabongari, 27th October 2011) seem to favor the Sharia court more than the magistrate courts for obvious advantages. He says Sharia court dispenses of cases with dispatch and the Hausa people have greater respect for the rulings of the Sharia courts. Either party also agrees that religious riots are seen more as disruption of business than any source of animosity. There is also the belief that riots are mere manifestations of poverty and machinations of political interests.

Kaduna, on the other hand, is more prone to violence due to its large population share of Muslim and Christians which portends higher susceptibility to religious polarization. The city is marked by its bureaucratic culture. The spread of government offices and factories depicts formal sector dominance. The city has high unemployment rate; a manifestation of a depressed economy, underpaid workers, retired civil servants etc. The informal sector which requires low capital is saturated with even graduates. Most of the informal sector activities like tailoring, motorcycle

taxi other garment production; embroidery, butchery etc. have associations that are institutionalized over time to regulate conduct in the various activities. There is the wide belief among informal economic actors that interreligious cooperation is giving way because of intermittent religious violence. The cumulative effect is taking its toll by throwing fears of a spontaneous outbreak of violence in the minds of operators without warning, leading to segregation of residential areas and disruption of economic activities.

The study concluded that religiously specialized organizations do not appear to be any more divisive than religiously mixed ones, that the effort to integrate unregistered economic activities into the formal administrative system, such as taxation and other state linkages, with trade associations, have only served to aggravate instead of lessening the tensions in the north. The trade unions, though constituted of different ethnic groups, they were however drawn into the web of politics, thus sharking on their responsibility to their members.

Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The interreligious mediation peace Strategy. Omotosho (2015). The paper highlighted most of the ethnoreligious conflicts in Northern Nigeria, the Niger Delta youth restiveness and communal clashes over borders across the country and the role of interreligious bodies and non-governmental organizations in curbing ethnoreligious conflicts in the country. The Nigerian government in conjunction with non-governmental organizations has made efforts to set up institutions to curb ethnoreligious conflicts in Nigeria. While some operate on an ad hoc basis other have developed mechanisms to check ethnoreligious conflicts (Kwaja, 2009; Ahmed, 2007). Faith-based organizations and interreligious



mediation groups have also been part of the exercise. While many of these organizations have many schemes for mediating between conflicting parties through scripture-based peace-making, many religious communities defied their solutions (Ibrahim, 1991). Islam and Christianity have co-existed in the northern part of the country and have occasionally been submerged in violent confrontations (Ibrahim, 1991; Williams & Falola, 1995).

At the inception of democratic rule in 1999, politicians began to manipulate religion in order to rig the political processes in their favor. The resolve of state governments to adopt the Sharia legal system further aggravated the situation (Yusuf, 2008). The Christians saw this as a challenge to the security of Nigeria. Adigun Agbaje (1990) projected that Nigeria is going to witness a lessening of religious and political tension. This was negated by the sudden escalation of religious and political violence after democratization. The introduction of Sharia in the north has claimed the lives of two thousand ethnic Hausa Muslims in the middle belt states of Benue, Plateau, Taraba and Nassarawa states (Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2012).

In faraway Abia state of southeastern Nigeria the Hausa Muslims lost about 1000 people (Igbokwe, 2000), a week of clashes in Jos left over 1000 dead (Kwaja, 2008; Contend, 2009). In May 2004, another conflict erupted when Muslims demonstrated over the killing of 600 Muslims in the small town of Yelwa in Shendam local government of Plateau state (Olasope, 2012; Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 2012). More than 30,000 have been displaced from their homes in Kano, the largest city in the north in a reprisal attack. Following a massacre of Muslims in neighboring Plateau state by a Christian gang early May 2004, 27,000 displaced people sought

refuge in Bauchi state (The Nigeria interreligious council, 2009) these clashes are more politically motivated than is often advocated, they have more to do with uneven wealth and power distribution. Apart from the adverse effect on economic and political stability, it has taken a serious toll on Nigeria's human capital. Considering this, therefore, prevention of conflicts becomes a necessary priority to guarantee socio-economic development.

Sequel to above the Nigeria interreligious council (NIREC) a Muslim/Christian organization, The interfaith mediation center of Muslim/Christian Dialogue forum (IMC-MCDF) in Kaduna and the International Peace league (IPL), a student organization based in University of Jos have made significant contribution towards crises resolution (Ahmed,2007; Berlin Declaration on Interreligious dialogue, 2007; Adeyemi, 2006). Awoniyi (2013) suggests "a systematic analysis of their convergences and divergences and their potential for cooperation and conflict for peace.

Reconciliations are schemes used to restore cordial relationships among individuals and groups. Just as conflicts have dimensions so also reconciliation. There is the spiritual, political, psychological and social (Ahmed, 2007).To reconcile between conflicting groups therefore, third parties are usually involved in mediation, as conflicting parties rarely follow the course of mediation (Zartman & Touval, 1996). Interreligious dialogue is a purposeful activity that aims to promote peaceful coexistence among divergent groups. It encourages harmonious relationships through the development of friendship and spirit of tolerance (Ahmed, 2007).

The IMC in Kaduna is renowned for its conciliatory efforts at defusing tension in Kaduna over the years. These types of bodies' liaise with all religious organizations and listen to their grievances while at the same time cautioning against flirting with the religious fundamentalists. The religious leaders are encouraged to co-opt other religious sects in order to protect them from the overtures of extremist ideologues.

These interfaith mediators in partnership with other peace practitioners promote good governance; facilitate empowerment of citizens through training and peacebuilding throughout Northern Nigeria. The international peace league has also seen to a high-level consultation in February 2004 and May 2004 for an interreligious relationship in Jos (Kwaja, 2009). The Nigeria interreligious council (NIREC) and other conflict management stakeholders have fashioned out a mechanism of early warning which will assist the government, security agencies, community leaders and others involved in nipping a potential crisis in the bud.

The UNESCO also encourages regular interreligious dialogue to promote a shared understanding and objective view of common interests (UNESCO Final declaration, 2003). The interactive sessions have also been midwives under the platform of UNESCO such as the international congress of cultures in West Africa held in Abuja Nigeria 2003 and 'Religion in Peace and Conflict: Responding to Militancy and Terrorism' in Melbourne Australia (April 2005). These encounters sensitize the religious leaders on the need to work in harmony to achieve common goals such as development, poverty alleviation, religious mediation and social justice. A peaceful environment for rational discourse should be maintained to discourage extremist rhetoric from flourishing (Weigel, 1991; Williamson, 1992; Takaya, 1992).

In conclusion, “Based on their legacy of invoking social trust, religious agents are often the only ones capable of securing some social cohesion” and interfaith religious organizations are advised to intensify their interreligious dialogue based on the principles of enhancing multi-religious networking, trust building, collaborating and promoting the understanding of religious differences.

Efforts to make the Nigerian state safe from religious conflicts should be high on the socio-political agenda of the federal government and various interreligious mediation groups.

### **Theoretical Proposition**

The “fear of extinction theory” developed by Horowitz (1985) was also used to study ethnic conflict in post-communist states. The theory proposes that: Much of the tension between ethnic groups comes from group comparison;

1. People tend to pit themselves against other groups to determine their relative worth/status. Group identity therefore strongly affects one’s self-esteem since group influence is central to individual identity.
2. The outcome of some colonial policies strengthened group’s identities which favored certain groups thereby creating advanced and backward groups. As long as there is a disparity in group influence which invariably affects individual self-esteem, there will always be a struggle for predominance within the polity especially for a people who are equal in population size and under a democratic dispensation. The disparity in economic paths which guarantees that ethnic and economic conflicts do not coincide, notwithstanding; Horowitz argues that, in-group elites may

encourage their group to catch up to and emulate advanced groups. Many groups that are reckoned to be backward have an anxious fear of going extinct like the red Indians of America if they fall behind. The minority ethnic groups who are Christians' have a sizable population in Kaduna state. There is the likelihood, therefore, that they will use the democratic dispensation to correct long-standing political and economic imbalance by exhorting their in-group members to engage in violence which invariably disrupts any form of progress made in the area of democratic consolidation and stability.

## **2.8 Structural Theory Of Conflict**

The research finds the structural theory of conflict most suitable for this study. It is therefore used as a guide for the conduct of this investigation. The theory has two main strands. The first which is the radical structural theory has Marx, Lenin, and Engels as its exponents. The second which is liberal structuralism has Scarborough (1998) Ross (1993) and the famous work of Galtung (1990) which is 'structural violence'. The theory explains social conflict the outcome of economic and political marginalization, inequity, injustice, exploitation and poverty. It emphasizes the relations of production and the contradictions there within under the existing social organization. Ross (1993:4) argues that where one group monopolizes the socio-economic and political processes of society, it is a strong invitation for the serious fallout. Diamond (1988) believes that the conflicts in post-colonial Nigeria were generated as a result of the emergence of a political class that translated political power as the opportunity to corner the vast resources of the state for themselves. Where one group is favored at the expense of others, when recognition is not

extended to other constituent groups, when the dominant group is insensitive to the right of others, conflict is imminent. (Scarborough, 1998).

The structural theorists believe factors such as economic and social, political and institutional as well as ethnic (demographic and geographic) who exert pressure on the people's settlement and resources account for most social conflicts.

The theory has a shortcoming since it fails to explain the intensity of social conflicts, protracted nature of conflicts and how long conflicts take because its primary focus is the economic factor. Those behind the conflict may not be interested in material benefit but perhaps recognition.

## **2.9 Psycho-cultural Theory Of Conflict**

To address the issue of recognition therefore, the psycho-cultural theory is also adopted. Ross (1993) is of the view that, in spite of the variety of identity types, violent conflicts are explained based on the people's ethnic background and the culture into which people are socialized. The salient feature of ethnicity on the basis of which protracted ethnic conflicts ensue is identity. Scholars believe that ethnicity is the single biggest fault line for ethnic conflicts, but they point out that the existence of ethnic differences does not necessarily portend conflict.

Conflicts take long to resolve when identity is the basis upon which a group is discriminated against and deprived of the satisfaction of their basic material and psychological needs which range from food to the attainment of the greatest human potential, which is self-actualization (Maslow, 1970; Burton, 1990). Other needs of

competing importance include, Political and economic empowerment, belonging, self-esteem and physical security, but theorists in this area see the recognition and protection of identity as most important.

Crichton (1991) in line with Horowitz's 'fear of extinction thesis' Rothschild's 'fear of the future' thesis and Volkan's 'fear of dying off' thesis posits that conflicts that become long drawn are in most cases identity-driven and are the outcomes of helplessness and memories of past oppressions. The experience of oppression, victimization, humiliation and feeling of inferiority which degrades a person's dignity and self-esteem and induces vengeance constitute a pathological dimension of ethnicity. (Rothschild and Groth, 1995). Identity as an unshakeable sense of self-worth gives one a feeling of physical, social, psychological and spiritual safety and makes life more meaningful (Northrup, 1989). Lake and Rothschild (1996) opine that subjective view of social reality draws from the experiences of past interactions with others. The tendency to view things in a selective way is to a large extent a result of a history of a struggle for scarce resources in which the adversaries are invariably winners.

## **2.10 Summary of The Chapter**

The chapter reviewed relevant literature related to the topic Ethnoreligious conflicts in especially Northwestern Nigeria. Literature on Ethnicity, Religion, Ethnic conflicts, and Democracy were gleaned to broaden understanding of the issues under focus, limit the scope of the study to relevant area and to help in directing the research towards satisfactorily satisfying the research objectives.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter describes the methodology used in conducting the research which includes the reason for choosing a qualitative method, explaining research tools, describing the study area and sampling strategy as well as data analysis.

#### **3.2 Reason for Adopting Qualitative Approach**

The qualitative approach is designed in such a way that a thorough knowledge of subject matter is gained by asking probing questions until a satisfactory level of understanding is attained. Boyce and Neale (2006) noted that in-depth interviews are particularly useful where a deeper understanding of a social phenomenon is sought. The study used the Structural conflict theory as a guide for the conduct of the investigation and psycho- cultural theory that explains the violent action of a deprived group.

Ethno-religious conflicts are especially sensitive issues in the northwestern Nigeria that people do not readily oblige to discuss or grant interviews on (HRW, 2012; Angerbrandt, 2015), this makes in-depth interviews more suitable where a researcher is able to find a willing participant.

### **3.3 Sources Of Data**

The research used secondary as well as primary data sources. The secondary data sources include textbooks, journals, newspapers, and other accessible documents. The primary sources are respondents from the public who were directly or indirectly affected by the crises.

#### **3.3.1 Research Setting**

The North Western Nigeria is made up of seven states which include Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, and Sokoto. Others are Kebbi, Zamfara, and Kaduna which is the focus of this particular study. The states that make up this zone altogether account for close to 30% of Nigeria's total population going by the National population Census of 2006. The predominant tribes are Hausa, Fulani, and numerous others.

#### **3.3.2 Participants**

A total of twelve participants were interviewed in Kaduna, Zaria, Kafanchan and Zangon Kataf. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2006) note that research, the aim of which is to explore and understand the views and opinions of a number of people, 12 interviewees are sufficient. Participants were selected from the various purposefully selected locations. Willing participants who were consented before their responses were recorded were secured through a linkman and some friends. Notes were also taken while the interview was on to guard against the failure of the recording device.

#### **3.3.3 Data Collection Strategies**

In order to obtain detailed information on the subject of interest, open-ended questions were asked the participants. This permitted them to open up on the subject

of ethnoreligious conflicts and its impact on democratic stability. Clarifications and further information were sought by asking probing questions. Some of the interviews lasted up to one hour but the least was eighteen minutes.

### **3.3.4 Data Analysis Procedures**

Step by step process of data analysis was conducted in agreement with research procedure (Creswell,2014). The management of data is a tedious and complex task, as such the researcher employed the use of Nvivo 11 for ease of preparation and management of data.

The software is used to ease the complex process of data analysis by speeding up the process of sorting and coding of data. To start data analysis on Nvivo 11 the transcribed data was first imported. The questions were transmuted into major themes and coded as parent nodes. Under the parent nodes, all relevant information was variously auto coded into child nodes. Through this process, data is categorized into themes, sub-themes, and sub-sub themes. Irrelevant data were weeded out after careful consideration of their meanings. The selective coding is structured in such a way that the research questions were answered.

Five major themes emerged from the analyses which include:

1. Influence of ethnicity on justice.
2. Influence of religion on Justice.
3. Influence of ethnicity and religion on political tolerance.
4. History, Culture and the Political behavior of the people and
5. Mutual Coexistence.

Theme 1 had six sub-themes, the two had generated five sub-themes and five sub-sub themes, theme three had seven sub-themes and three sub-sub themes, theme four generated six subthemes, five sub-sub themes, and one sub-sub-sub theme and finally, theme five had five sub-themes and two sub-sub themes. Based on what the research was able to garner from the participants the research questions were adequately answered.

From the data collected in the in-depth interviews and the relevant information obtained from the twelve participants in the study which answered questions 1 and 2 the results of the analysis is hereby presented. As was earlier stated the interviews were conducted between August and September. The objective of this chapter is to establish the influence of ethnicity and religion on democratic stability by focusing on justice as an integral part of democratic process.

Justice which is an important democratic value denotes the fair distribution of public goods Fraser (1998), the absence of which destabilizes a whole polity. There are a lot of scholarly interests in ethnoreligious conflicts in the North West, and specifically, Kaduna state but attention to the issue of justice has been dismal.

Table 3.1

*List of Participants*

Serial no.	Participant	Status	Tribe
1	Participant1	Businessman	Hausa/Fulani
2	Participant2	Businessman	Fulani
3	Participant3	Journalist	Hausa/Fulani

4	Participant4	Traditional ruler	Hausa
5	Participant5	Retired civil servant	Atyap
6	Participant 6	civil servant	Hausa
7	Participant7	Academic	Fulani
8	Participant8	Academic	Ninzom
9	Participant9	Academic	Hausa/Fulani
10	Participant 10	Journalist	Fulani
11	Participant 11	Academic	Hausa/Fulani
12	Participant 12	Civil servant	Kaje

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### 3.4 Method of Data Collection

#### 3.4.1 Interview

The researcher conducted face to face interviews with participants. Unstructured and open-ended questions were administered to generate sufficient data for a deeper understanding of the problem in context. The goal of the research is to come to grasp with the living experiences of the participants while they interact with others. A one-on-one interview is a useful method because of its flexibility as it affords researcher the capacity to ask probing questions for clarity. It is assumed that the researcher and the participants coproduce the data. To enrich the data, therefore, Charmaz (2006) exhorts the researcher to add a description of the situation ie “the interaction, the person's affect and their perception of how the interview went.” Where face to face interview could not be secured, telephone interviews were employed.

### 3.5 Sampling Strategy

Collecting qualitative data and analysing it is a tedious and time consuming task, therefore the more the number of cases or individuals the more the length of time. As such the number of sample could range between 1-40 depending on the case under study (Cresswell, 2014:231). This study selected twelve interviewees so that the data does not become unwieldy. Charmaz (2006) alternatively came with the idea of saturation from grounded theory. This is when collecting fresh data becomes needless, because the categories and themes have been saturated. The sites selected for the study includes areas that have seen more ethnoreligious crises; Kafanchan, Zangon kataf and Kaduna metropolitan. The selection of sites and participants is purposeful as suggested by (Miles and Huberman/1994).

### 3.6 Data Recording And Analysis

The research recorded responses by handwritten notes as well as by audio taping. The interview responses were hand written in order to guard against failure of the recording device. Data analysis in qualitative research is always in line with the research strategy chosen. In general, analysis involves breaking up and systematically organizing text and image data in such a way that it makes sense. Creswell (2014) suggests that data collection and analysis could be a simultaneous exercise ie while the interview is on-going the researcher may be analyzing an interview conducted previously which may guide his direction of the interview.

In order to make the process less cumbersome, much of the data was weeded out as suggested by (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). This is the process by which data is aggregated into a few number of themes. (Creswell, 2013). These were then used

to systematically organize and manage data using the qualitative software program NVivo,



Figure 3.1 Map of North Western Nigeria

### 3.7 Northwestern Nigeria

The northwestern region is situated alongside the north central region. It is home to about 41.8 million people, one-fourth of the total population of Nigeria. The population of the region is predominantly Muslim and Kano which is the commercial hub of the region is second only to Lagos in terms of population. Among the seven states making up the region, it is only Kaduna which has any form of diversity.

The north-west is also constituted by the ancient Hausa states of Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara, and Zazzau, which were brought under a common political entity by the 19th century Jihad led by Usman bin Fodio. By absolute figures the Hausa speaking people are dominant in the zone and along with the Yoruba and the

Igbo control the Nigerian political and economic scene. However various other ethnic and linguistic groups are to be found in the area.

They include the Zabarmawa, Dakarkari, Kambari, Gungawa, Dakkawa, Dandawa, Kaje, Kataf, Gwari etc. However, a greater percentage of people resident in the zone speak Hausa as the common language of communication. Hausa identity hinges upon not only language but also on religion since a true 'Bahausha' (Hausa man) is a Muslim. Hausa speakers who maintain their pre-Islamic beliefs are referred to as "Maguzawa" (sing. 'Bamaguje') and one common means of expression of conversion to Islam is "Na zama Bahausha" (lit. I became a Hausa) (Khalid, 2007). Thus Hausa ethnic identity is a complex of variables involving not only language but also religion and even descent (Khalid, 2007).

The Fulani, Hausa, Zabarmawa and Dandawa and a host of other tribes in the region are predominantly Muslim in the zone. There are also animists who practice traditional religion all over the zone and across the ethnic divide. Agriculture is the mainstay of the northwest. Crops grown at subsistence level include millet, guinea corn, maize, rice, and yam; while peanuts, cotton, tobacco and gum-Arabic are the common cash crops. The Hausas in particular combine farming and trading rather than exclusive peasant cultivation. During the dry season, they indulge in some kind of craft or trade.

The zone has produced prominent leaders like Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarkuna of Sokoto former Premier of northern Nigeria and leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), Murtala Muhammad, Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari, Muhammadu



Buhari and Sani Abacha. Its political position did not, however, make any better than the other zones, if anything, the zone today, is reckoned to be the most backward zone in the country. The incidence of ignorance, poverty, disease, malnutrition and poor housing is more apparent in the northwest than in any other part of Nigeria.

The national consumer survey reported that the average expenditure per month for the country as at 2001 was N4, 058. Out of the country's six geo-political zones, the northwest had the least figure of N2, 942. The zone also recorded the lowest figure of household income of N3, 769 while the highest figure of N7, 213 came from the southern zone. The level of poverty is also pronounced; about 54% of the people live below the poverty datum line, which seconds only to the north east zone. The zone has the least access to education facilities. With over 25% of the total population of the country, it could not produce one percent of the total candidates eligible for admission into the Nigerian universities as 2000 (JAMB; UME Report 2000). The household survey also showed that 73% of the male population in the zone has not attended western type school, compared with 18% in the south-west; amongst the females, the figures are 80 and 30 percent respectively (World Bank Report, 1998).

### **3.7.1 Kaduna State**

The choice of Kaduna State as a case study is informed by several factors. The state has seen some of the most violent ethnoreligious crises in a country that has been characterized as one of the most deeply divided in Africa, in that ethnic, regional and religious cleavages underlie recurrent violent conflicts (Osaghae 2001:17). It was also there that the first major ethnoreligious clashes erupted after power was transferred from military to civilian rulers in 1999. Politically, Kaduna State is

in the state. Most economic activities are controlled by them a  
direction of the state. The predominant economic activity is ag  
state is made up of twenty-three local government areas;  
Paduna (predominantly Christian)



Figure 3.2 Map of Kaduna state

### **3.8 Summary of The Chapter**

This Chapter discussed the methods adopted in conducting the research and made attempts to justify the adoption of the research methods. The data analysis procedure was also presented including the research area.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA ANALYSIS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Many reasons have been adduced to the recurrence of violent ethnoreligious conflicts which includes agitations on issues like primordial ties, national resource distribution, power sharing, ethnic tolerance, and welfare Awoniyi (2000). The results of this study's analysis however substantially point to improper handling of issues to do with justice which has in no small measure contributed to the worsening socio-political situation in Kaduna state.

With the research questions in mind, the participants were asked to talk about justice in Kaduna state and how it possibly influences ethno-religious disharmony. Their responses were recorded on a device as well as handwritten. The data analysis is hereby presented.

## 4.2 Influence of Ethnicity on Justice




Figure 4.1 Influence of ethnicity on justice

Going by numerous studies in the area of ethnoreligious conflicts, there are myriads of reasons attributable to the conflicts. The analysis of interviews using Nvivo 11 in this study suggests that the recurrent violent confrontations in Kaduna state are a result of poor handling of social justice through corruption, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and the unique status of Kaduna the capital city.

## 4.3 Corruption

Corruption is one single phenomenon which could destabilize a society. Most societies today are grappling with the menace of corruption because once it begins to permeate a society, it stagnates it. It is popularly conceived as the misuse of public office, wealth, and power for personal advantage. (Participant 12) in the study holds the view that “Political office holders think of themselves, their families and ethnic groups first in the allocation of public goods.” In the same vein (participant 8) says

“Proper guidelines are not followed in resource allocation; Chief executives always have their way”.

Duruji Moses posits that Corruption in government compromises the ideals of democracy (free, fair and peaceful democratic process); Resources meant for development are misdirected, Personal advancements are put above the corporate interest of society. Therefore where personal elevation and largesse, becomes the priority of political actors, then the democratic process is impaired by power struggle instead of a competition over policies. When the prize on political power is so great, political contests would be fierce, they would stop at nothing to win (Duruji,2010).

Osaghae (2005) has further characterized corrupt political arena as amoral, which is quite permissive of inexcusable behaviors that would ordinarily attract condemnation; politicians do not find it expedient to represent their people, and political contest is a mere exercise as the consent of the people to govern is not sought; as such, government becomes more of a personal estate; and the instrumental motive is what drives politicians to seek office.

#### **4.4 Nepotism**

When politicians are corrupt the best only way to keep them in power is through nepotism. This is mostly associated with heterogeneous societies. Communities that have primordial divisions tend to consider the interests of their group members first in resource allocation. It is the unfair practice by people in positions of authority to give jobs and other benefits to especially relatives or group members.

Participant 10 explaining the impact of nepotism looks at it from the judicial angle and he says “cases that are taken to traditional leaders (Mai unguwa, Dagaci, Hakimi, Sarki, etc) for local hearing, ethnic sentiments interfere and the leaders in most cases rule and pass judgment in favor of their ethnic/tribal kinsmen. Participant 11, on the other hand, looks at the political angle. He sees the political calculation and permutation of who gets what, when, and how of the Political benefits in Kaduna state as the main source of hostility and conflicts.

Participants 2 and 3 believe heads of government departments reserve appointments for their cronies, as such; there is favoritism and nepotism in appointments and postings.

Ethnic conflict is an endemic feature of all plural societies, there is a proposition that a lot of ethnic conflicts could be rooted in the predisposition of a people to ethnic nepotism which can be regarded as an extended form of nepotism? Competition for scarce resources tends to predispose a group of people to favor their own members over others who are considered non-members. This tendency is significant in political and social life, particularly where people have to struggle for scarce resources. Evolutionary theories of inclusive fitness and kin selection proffer explanation on the basis of and endemic nature of nepotism. The significant political implication of ethnic nepotism has been hypothesized thus: (1) significant ethnic cleavages the world over are reckoned to be behind all ethnic interest conflicts. (2) The more ethnic cleavages in a society the more ethnicized political and sundry interests are Wunti (2016)

#### 4.5 Significance of Kaduna

Perhaps if Kaduna had not been so strategic, the costly and intermittent conflagrations in the state would have been averted. In his response participant 6 explains how developments have been concentrated in Kaduna the capital city. One can easily understand perhaps it is because it is home to most northern leaders of the country both Muslim and Christian. Paden (1986:580) portrays how Nigeria was divided into three regions representing political units in the federation and Kaduna was made the capital of the Northern region. It, therefore, became the political power base of the ruling class. The construction industry, manufacturing sector and later the oil refinery and automobile assembly plant were reinforced by major state and transnational investments. The foundation for the development of Kaduna was laid by the northern bureaucratic elites who had a close relationship with the emirates (Andrae and Beckman 1998:89-90).

Migrants from neighboring communities in the north began streaming into Kaduna because of job opportunities. After Lagos, Kaduna became the second most important city politically in Nigeria; the two became the main centers of political power. For many political and bureaucratic elites in the north, Kaduna became their second home. According to Paden (1986:315). The influx of migrants from all over Nigeria and the political status of Kaduna have made it a significant player in the national politics. The status of Kaduna has remained the same to a large extent and this perhaps informs the struggle for a new state because of the perception that Kaduna seems to be more the political capital of the north than of Kaduna State. (Angerbrandt, 2015)



#### 4.6 Marginalization

Taking into cognizance the trend of events after Nigeria's independence, the three centers of power in the country were controlled by the dominant tribes of the regions. Kaduna is no exception. There are cries of marginalization throughout the state because it seems development infrastructure is concentrated in Kaduna. Other cities and towns across the state don't seem to notice an even spread of development.

Participant 1 denies any imbalance though. He argues

*You see everything now is distributed proportionate to population and clearly northern Kaduna has a higher population than the south as such both state and federal appointments are skewed in favor of northern Kaduna". The only time injustice is noticed is during and after ethnic and religious crises. For instance the Zangon- Kataf crises, where despite the Muslims being the victims 79 were arrested and prosecuted while only 9 were prosecuted from the aggressor Kataf or Atyp as they are called.*

Conversely, participant 5 "believes in terms of infrastructural and industrial development and provision of social amenities, the southern Kaduna has been left behind".

Participant 6 on the other hand, argues that "both north and southern Kaduna suffer marginalization. He says, if social justice means an even development across regions and peoples, then it has been to some extent lopsided in favor of Kaduna metropolis".

Participant 8 says, "The quota system which is a constitutional provision to promote equity in appointments to public offices is jettisoned."

Nnoli (1995) commenting on marginalization states that the solidarity of individuals as seen in plural societies is the result of ethnicity which brings groups together in a

deliberate effort to promote cohesion among members, mobilize them to support each other and stimulate in them the idea of self-identity and group security. He believes ethnicity secures group members from oppression and exploitation. The factional struggle of the dominant class within the society to use the state to further their economic interest brings into conflict the various constituent groups in the process of primitive accumulation which engenders ethnicity.

The dictatorial nature of leadership style Ibrahim (1991) believes, is to a large extent responsible for ethnic conflicts. He says the aspirations of a large segment of the African communities are repressed by many African governments. The divide and rule system adopted by the British are in some cases put to use by the regimes which further aggravates the fragmentation of the society. To him, unpopular regimes whose legitimacy is suspect, because of their failure to serve in public interest, or failure to offer public services, or secure and protect the rights of the people, the tendency is for them to recant and revert to repression. He believes people tend to retreat into primordial enclaves as a result of a decline in government.

Wolff (2006) noted that complex historical antecedents and cultural heterogeneity among ethnic groups in addition to calculated economic and social marginalization of one group by another could promote the perception of injustice, discrimination, and the attempt to scuttle the citizenship rights of the marginalized group. Recurrent violent ethnic conflicts could be well understood through these insights. (Wunti, 2016).

The principle of Federal Character as adopted by the federal government has made resource allocation according to the percentage of a community relative to the total population of a state. Participant 1 believes “everything now is distributed proportionate to population and clearly northern Kaduna has higher population than the south as such both state and federal appointments are skewed in favor of northern Kaduna”. Participant 7 shares the same view when he said “looking at the positions of authority they occupy relative to their number, I think there is fair distribution of appointments in the civil service”.

The federal government in its bid to give every Nigerian a sense of belonging introduced the federal character principle prior to the 1976 constitution drafting committee”. It states that the composition of the federal government or any of its agencies should reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity. This includes appointing one minister from each state, having one member from each state on the electoral commission and so on. The principle promotes equity in the distribution of resources and power sharing among the federating units, and by this mollify ethnic and regional agitations. It ensures non-dominance of one ethnic group in any administrative unit (Suberu, 2006; Kirk-Greene, 1983).

Tracing one’s genealogy to a particular local community is an essential requirement for national appointments as well as certain privileges to do with land allocation, educational opportunities, employment, vying for political positions etc. This means for one to enjoy full citizenship rights he has to identify with an ethnically defined area within a state. The possibility of converting to an indigene from a stranger is

remote. On this, the principle has been decisive and this contributes to the nature of ethnic relations. “although state and local government creation have reconfigured the indigene/settler structure” (Alubo, 2009:4,7).

#### 4.7 Discrimination

In line with the above statement discrimination is also part of the triggers of ethnic conflicts. Participant 1 says

*the only time injustice is noticed is during and after ethnic and religious crises. For instance the Zangon- Kalaf crises, where despite the Muslims being the victims 79 were arrested and prosecuted while only 9 were prosecuted from the aggressor Kdaf or Atyap as they are called.*

Participant 8 says

*from the security perspective, one would say there is no social justice because citizens are subjected to unnecessary hardships in the hands of security men from rival ethnic groups in the state. For persons under remand pending investigations, the tendency is for prosecuting officers to frame-up charges that could lead to the eventual conviction of a citizen.*

The struggle for cultural autonomy, language, self-determination, and religious pre-eminence are all asserted through ethnicity and religious prejudice in Nigeria. The complex socio-cultural setup and religious differentiation often account for the discrimination between the various constituent groups within the polity. Viewing the plural nature of Nigeria in terms of religion and ethnicity, it is no surprise that the relationship between the diverse social groups; ethnic and religious is characterized

by disaffection, mutual suspicion, and mistrust owing to the prevalence of some contextual discrimination. (Salawu, 2010)

#### **4.7.1 Settler- Indigene Dichotomy**

Discrimination invariably results in dichotomizing the citizens in to settlers and indigenes. This is an issue that has been generating tension in the polity. Conflicts ensue as a result of the deprivation suffered by non-indigenes or settlers of localities to enjoy certain rights and privileges which are extended only to indigenes of the area. Participant 9 is particularly worried about the treatment of migrants in the state through the discriminatory allocation of resources and privileges, he laments the settler-indigene dichotomy both in the North and south of Kaduna. Developments in Nigeria have reached a level where a Nigerian is unsure of a socio-political status in an area where he is a non-indigene. The attempt to claim indigene ship of a particular geopolitical space is seriously constrained because of the discriminatory tendencies of the local communities. The creation of sub-federal political units based on primordial identities has made it difficult for citizens other than those indigenous to the community to attain full citizenship rights due to the allusion of the 1979 constitution to an indigene of a community as he whose “parent or grandparent is a member of a community indigenous to that state”. It has further been compounded by making it mandatory for each state to have its indigene representing the state at the federal cabinet. This explains why many states in northern Nigeria and even in the south are prone to series of violence which are costly as it involves several hundreds of lives and property owing to attempts by the indigenous community to deprive non-indigene communities of economic opportunities and the exercise of their full citizenship rights. (Wunti, 2016)




Figure 4.2 Participants on the influence of ethnicity on justice

#### 4.8 Influence of Religion on Justice




Figure 4.3 Influence of religion on justice

#### 4.9 Corruption

Corruption has to a large extent been responsible for the democratic instability in Nigeria. All parameters depicting the failure of democratic regimes are manifest

today. Political assassinations, mismanagement of resources, ethnoreligious conflicts, political intolerance, and human rights abuse are the manifestations of Corruption.

In line with the above, participant 8 says “there is a struggle within the elites to carve out a ration of the wealth for oneself, his family and ethnic group depending on the position”. This is owing to an unfettered access to the resources of society as guaranteed by the acquisition of political power in Nigeria; they are then personalized and used to further one’s economic objectives. Politics in Nigeria could be likened to an enterprise where officials arrogate to themselves the power to freely access the government funds and resources for personal ends without accountability. (Joseph, Fawole, and Ibeanu, in Ogundiya, 2010).

#### 4.9.1 Abdication of Responsibility

Osaghae (1995) argues that the amoral sphere under which the politicians operate is at the center of democratic instability in Africa and especially Nigeria where state operators abuse their positions in the pursuit of private ends.

Participant 2 says

*religion is wielded as a tool to shield one from his statutory responsibility, which impacts on justice and this is especially brought about by politicians. After winning elections they jettison the party constitution which outlines the objectives and programs of action of the party to pursue their personal agenda. Once in power, the party loses control over them”.*

So the government does not carry everybody along.

Ibrahim (1995) argues that the undemocratic governance style is instrumental to the incessant conflicts in Nigeria. He says those in positions of authority in Africa

downplay the importance of the political aspirations of the people; they render them powerless by repressive policies. They employ divisive strategies to disunite the people and generate more ethnoreligious cleavages so the people will not be focused on development objectives. To him, regimes that have fallen out of favor or whose legitimacy is at stake on account of their irresponsibility in governance tend to adopt despotic policies to suppress the citizens. He believes institutional decay beats people into a retreat to their primordial groups for security.

#### **4.9.2 Government The Major Source of Wealth**

Government patronage has devalued the virtue of labor (Awoniyi,2013). It makes people stupendously rich without necessarily engaging in productive activity which stifles the zeal of people for productive enterprise. (Participant 8) says

*everybody is jostling for political power so as to have access to the resources of society because the government seems to be the only major source of wealth. Resource allocation revolving around ethnicity and religion generates intense competition because Nigerian political arena is organized in such a way that economic productivity is not a measure of success.*

#### **4.10 Political Exclusion**

These are various attempts by 'indigenous communities' to make impotent; politically, the 'non-indigene settler communities'. This is in order to make an exclusive claim on federally allocated revenues to their Kinsmen. (participant 1) says Ethnicity and religion in Kaduna cannot be separated since the various communities (ethnic groups) in southern Kaduna constitute one political bloc, the reason being they are all Christians against the predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslims. Even after the creation of chiefdoms, they are still political allies.

Participant 10 says:



*Religious influence depends on the time/circumstance, post contested and the area/part of the state and the dominant tribe/religion. In the Kafanchan area dominated by Christians, a Muslim cannot win the election even if he/she comes from the indigenous tribes in the area. In essence, Muslim politicians in that area are only encouraged to aspire for deputy/vice positions. Hausas/Muslims are only used as leaders to delegations or spokespersons when going for advocacy to influential people of Muslim/Hausa origin like Emir of Jema'a.*

Another respondent; participant 11 observes that “the political calculation and permutation of who gets what, when, and how of the Political benefits in Kaduna state, therefore, are the main sources of hostility and conflicts.” The next respondent; participant 3 has the view that “every citizen identifies with his ethnic group politically. No cross-cutting relationship in political activities”. The Recent creation of new chiefdoms in southern Kaduna has differentiated the communities but when it comes to politics they regroup to form a bloc against the Hausa Fulani says Participant 4.

*When democracy came ethnic champions began to invoke ethnicity in the determination of democratic activities. Where the ethnic champions are pitted against each other, so also are their followers. So ethnicity has a serious influence on political tolerance in the state. At every round of election, there is always Hausa-Fulani party and the southern Kaduna tribes pitch camp with another party says participant 6.*

From observation you see up to today parties are formed on the ethnic line in Kaduna like any other state. For instance, APC is formed by North while the south is inclined towards PDP. There is an element of ethnicity. There is no political party devoid of all this. Party manifestos are not the guiding instruments of conduct says participant 7.

Ake (1992: 4) says “the politicization of ethnicity and the ethnicization of politics in Africa, has led to the formation of ethnopolitical units whose preoccupation is the exclusive preservation of their ethnic group membership to serve their competing interests. For Fearon (1999: 853), When Political or economic benefits are unrealizable except through the appeal to ethnic background or where political alliances tend to follow ethnic affiliations then ethnicity is politicized.

#### **4.11 Power Struggle**

The struggle for power within the polity is because there is no accountability. Resources of society are there for the taking so long as one has claim to the authority to control access to the resources. So religion, ethnicity, and any other primordial division can be put to use to acquire power thus promoting political intolerance.

Politicians also to a large extent play significant role in creating more gaps indirectly purposely to score political goals Participant 10 argues that “religion is a tool sometimes used to check the excesses of government as well as maintain a hold on power or frustrate the efforts of one group to attain a particular objective”. Participant 12 also believes that,

Political power has been behind political intolerance in Kaduna. It created the divide between Northern and southern Kaduna. No dividends of democracy are coming and no favorable power sharing arrangement. If one part of the state is sure it can never have a shot at the position of power in the state the result is always dissent.

Ifemesia,(1965); Tamuno,(1965) believe that the combination of ethnicity and the motivation by religious fervor to build a political empire by migrant ethnic groups in their quest for power and economic resources was behind ethnic and political conflicts in Nigeria. That is why it is difficult to discern between religious, ethnic or political conflict in Nigeria because religion is at the center of the struggle for state formation.

Akwara and Ojomah, (2013) observe that that is why the state is politically constrained to mediate between conflicting ethnic groups and this generally makes the state the arena for intense competition between disparate ethnic groups for political power and by implication state resources (Ake, 1996). As such democracy is put in serious jeopardy when power is concentrated in a particular institution or organ; not only because economic inefficiency and political corruption thrive most under the condition, but it also makes political power a prize that must be won and kept at whatever cost. It becomes difficult to sanitize electoral contest when power is an end in itself (Diamond 1990). To counter the political anomaly, Lijphart suggests that, the elites who are capable of mobilizing their constituencies for hostility or cooperation relative to other groups are instrumental to tolerance and good governance. Therefore, it is in the best interest of a political community to consent elites, especially from minority groups to secure necessary cooperation in the struggle for political power. A guaranteed share of power to contending groups heightens their tolerance level and this leads to a legitimate and smooth run government with impartial laws (Charron, 2009).

For instrumentalists, acquisition of economic resources and political power is behind the mobilization of ethnic interests. Conflicts nowadays are generated not because of primordial needs (McKay, in Mousseau 2000).

#### **4.11.1 Fear of Marginalization**

The Hausa-Fulani in the north is skeptical about relinquishing power to the southern Kaduna tribes for fear of marginalization. But for political expediency, they always allocate to the minority groups the position of deputy governor (Participant 4). “The mutual suspicions and fear of domination between the two major religions have been the basis for rivalry”. (Metuh, 1994:88-89).

There are an estimated over three hundred and seventy ethnic groups in Nigeria each practicing one religion or other with traditional religious practices taking a less significant percentage, Islam and Christianity taking the larger percentage. Six geopolitical zones are also created out of the two major political blocs of Northern and southern Nigeria for administrative purpose and resource allocation. To promote national integration, encourage patriotism and instill in Nigerians nationalist orientation, section 14 (3) was instituted in the 1979 constitution which defines the Federal character expression. This is to defuse the primordial sentiments that are visited on every national issue. In other words, this is to make the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity less relevant. To integrate the diverse elements that make up Nigeria in order to warrant violence free, orderly and cohesive communities, all incoming governments strove to maintain the Federal Character principle (Edewor et al, 2014; Majokodunmi, 2013; FCC Handbook, 2006).

The Hausa-Fulani in the north is skeptical about relinquishing power to the southern Kaduna tribes for fear of marginalization. But for political expediency, they always have the position of deputy governor (Participant 4). Faleti (2006) argues that “conflicts are used mainly to inflict injuries, neutralize or subvert the aspirations of opponents”.

#### **4.11.3 Unfavorable Power Relations**

The ethnicization of politics has made some groups to feel marginalized because Nigerian politics is majoritarian as such groups that find themselves in a political unit with an ethnic group large enough to dominate the political space would feel frustrated which sometimes lead to conflict.

Yes, political power has been behind political intolerance in Kaduna. It created the divide between Northern and southern Kaduna. No dividends of democracy are coming and no favorable power sharing arrangement. If one part of the state is sure it can never have a shot at the position of power in the state the result is always dissent says participant 5.

A study by Huber (2012) finds that politicized ethnicity affects the voting pattern of a group. Politicians in Nigeria mobilize people on the basis of ethnicity. This shows how ethnicity is used by politicians to manipulate political processes. This development in addition to the consistent struggle of groups to avail them of development requirements has made the elites more powerful in their drive to primitive accumulation and political ascendancy. The incapacitation of minority elite groups to have easy access to resources of society on account of ethnic politics can

be frustrating. There is the high likelihood, therefore, of conflict between the underrepresented groups and the ruling elites.

#### 4.12 Social Exclusion

Participant 12 says religion is only a fault line used to segregate communities.

Participant 9 in his response says;

*The state has the history of ethnic, political and religious crises. Prior to 1992 Zango crises, there were mixed settlements in Kaduna, but after that there were demarcations. So bars, night clubs have been expunged to Rigasa the settlement of Christians. After the Sharia conflict, there was a complete demarcation. So generally where people cannot cohabit, there could hardly be political tolerance.*

Even before the advent of colonialism, the Hausa and Fulani constituted a distinct religious-cultural group in southern Kaduna different from the dominant demographic feature of the area. After the conquest of the southern Kaduna tribes, the British further dichotomized the communities by reinforcing the existing socio-political relationship.

It should be pointed out, however, that in the pre-colonial period, Zazzau and the Jema'a Emirates, exercised control over a significant number of the non-Muslim ethnic groups of southern Kaduna, but neither Zazzau nor Jema'a Emirate sought to fully integrate the non-Muslim ethnic groups into the larger emirate system or culture which is largely Islamic. (Suleiman,2011)




Figure 4.4 Participants on the influence of religion on justice

#### 4.13 Summary of The Chapter

To sum it all up, the result of the interviews conducted in Kaduna, through the analysis using Nvivo 11, point to the irrefutable role of the elites and the state government in compromising the stability of democracy in the state by purposefully being principal actors in corrupt practices, short-circuiting the democratic process through political power struggle and political exclusion, promoting and firing the embers of hatred through the settler/ indigene debacle. All these are perpetrated through the manipulation of ethnicity and religion which portends a grave outcome for social justice. Gurr (1989) argues that the frustrations of the group where the balance of power is in their disfavor can lead to rebellion, sabotage, and even violent insurrection.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE




Figure 5.1 Influence of religion on political tolerance.

#### 5.1 Introduction

Karpov (1999) believes that the political tolerance of a society depends on its political theology. The influence of the Church in the political space of the society, in other words, predicts the political tolerance in the polity. When the influences of socioeconomic status, age, and social liberalism are controlled, religious affiliation, commitment, and participation have only weak indirect effects on political tolerance. What predicts intolerance directly is a political correlate of religiosity support for the power of the church in society. Thus, political intolerance is predicted by theocratic



political beliefs rather than religious affiliation, commitment, and participation. (Karpov, 1999)

Partly because of their tendency to spill over from their initial theaters into other localities, states, or even regions of the federation, ethnoreligious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of the inter-group crisis in Nigeria. They have occurred mainly in the Middle-Belt and cultural borderline states of the Muslim north, where Muslim Hausa-Fulani groups have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups in a “dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities [in which it] is often difficult to differentiate between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin” (IDEA 2000: 296).

## **5.2 Influence Of Cleries**

The religious clerics have been instrumental in mobilizing their followers to take political action in most cases in the interest of the political class. Most, unfortunately, the action taken turns out to be invariably violent. Participant 1 says religion has tremendous influence as the churches and mosques have become centers of political indoctrination. The clergies in both institutions are influenced by politicians to sway the minds of citizens in favor of a particular candidate usually a Muslim in the mosques and a Christian in the churches.

Religious organizations are made up of officials who profess divergent ideas over philosophy and policy of their religions; this includes political philosophy. Leaders in such organizations tend to speak for their members; a religious body's followers may generally choose their creed. So these leaders who are perpetually in defense of

the political interest of their members are the "Religious actors" whether individually or as a collective, at the local level or on the international scene (Philpott, 2007).

### **5.3 Political Class Interest**

Religion has been known to be the most potent instrument for the manipulation of public opinion and political interests. So the political class makes effective use of religion in the face of stiff political competition in their quest for power. Participant 4 says "Religion and ethnicity as far as Kaduna state is concerned are inseparable. They are tools used by politicians to achieve political goals."

A Nigerian made a statement registering his disappointment with the expected dividends of peace from democracy, he said, 'when we were in the military regime we didn't get anything from the government, but we had peace. Now we are in a democracy, we don't get anything from the government and we don't have peace'. This comment captured the attention of the UNDP Human Development Report (2002:35). After the long sojourn of the military in governance, the politicians have been restless, gearing up to capture political power and customize the state and its oil wealth to their personal estates. The political class engaged in unrestrained competition for spheres of political influence, especially with the division of the country into six geopolitical zones which has further compounded the situation, as every politician derives benefit based on his ability to win substantial votes from his constituency. This invariably leads to unbridled competition exploiting every sectarian identity which is a recipe for violent confrontations among contending parties. The overnight billionaires from poor, jobless neighbors after a few years in government and the continued pauperization of the masses have further distanced the

people from the government as well as interrogate the legitimacy of the ruling government. As a result, political assassinations, mass abduction of popular politicians, ritual killings are rampant. Democracy starts with the demilitarization of the populace and entrenchment of democratic values. What obtain instead are intermittent conflicts among the people. (Ukiwo, 2003)

### **5.3.1 Religious Card**

“None performing or unpopular politicians who are threatened by electoral defeat tend to play the religious card appealing to religious sentiments in order to retain political power” says participant 5. “Obasanjo at the beginning of the fourth republic made efforts to integrate the people but the idea of using religion to achieve political objectives began to gain momentum during the Jonathan administration” says Participant 6. Religious institutions like the Muslim Izala sect and the Christian Association of Nigeria play a major role in promoting political intolerance in the state. Promotion of candidates is actively pursued by the religious associations through various media based on the religious affiliation of the candidate. Though the PDP, for instance, has membership across the state, the ANPP, CPC, and APC were regarded as Hausa-Fulani political parties as such were shunned by the southern Kaduna ethnic groups. So religion as well has a tremendous influence on political tolerance. Kaduna metropolis was divided in 2002 during the Shari’a crises. When President Jonathan came the situation worsened and Kaduna faced the biggest challenges. The Boko Haram had a free reign in the days of Jonathan and Yakowa. What is noticeable though is that; no part of southern Kaduna was bombed by Boko Haram. This promoted strong suspicion among the Muslim population argues participant 6. Elites in southern Kaduna have been playing the ethnoreligious card to

carve a sphere of influence for themselves within the local territory and beyond. (Suleiman, 2011).

#### **5.4 Political Exclusion**

To shut out political contenders from particular localities, religion is the most veritable instrument used by religious organizations and ethnic groups. Participant 12 blames religious organizations in the state. He believes:

*they are to a large extent responsible for intolerance. Politicians use religious organizations in the state to garner support through churches and mosques. Party affiliations are in most cases based on religious lines for instance right from 1999 to date there are parties that are considered Hausa/Fulani Muslim parties like the ANPP, CPC, and APC, while the PDP which has membership across the state has the bloc support of the southern Christian minorities. Even the recent 2015 election that is what played out. Religious sentiments and poor performance of the PDP led to its failure.*

To make the exclusion of the Hausa/Fulani in southern Kaduna effective, the minority ethnic groups have been agitating for autonomy from the Zazzau emirate. This will facilitate the eventual estrangement of the “settler communities” especially the Hausa/Fulani as well as create a middle-level power elite through the traditional political institutions (Suleiman, 2011).

#### **5.5 Religious Ignorance**

Most practitioners of both Islam and Christianity are not enlightened about either religion.

Participant 2 in his response to the question on the influence of religion on political tolerance says: “there is an inadequate knowledge of the religions both ways. People

don't get to study their religious provisions/ injunctions well, as such, whatever the cleric or clergy says is sacrosanct." Participant 9 says: "it is two pronged. Some people preach tolerance while others prefer exclusive religious communities, they are the intensely religious."

A sizable percentage of the followers of both Islam and Christianity have mutual ignorance of the religious standards of each other's faith. Added to this is the intentional or inadvertent acts that provoke reactions from the other faith (Metuh, 1994:88-89).

#### **5.5.1 Intense Religiosity**

Participant 9 believes "the idea of intense religiosity is two pronged. Some people preach tolerances while others prefer exclusive religious communities, they are the intensely religious". The phenomenal rise of religiosity in Nigeria for the past two decades has been an issue of serious concern because of its profound influence on democratic culture. Intense religiosity as the concomitant of the time, efforts, and resources devoted to the conduct of religious rites have been progressively exposed to political manipulation by political elites. The religious environment in Nigeria is growing in a unique cultural milieu. To a large extent, the standards of the various religious creeds run contrary to the democratic ideals. These include blind followership of religious leaders, sectarian exclusivity, intolerance and provocative speech. The fact that, the political theology of religiously plural societies is invariably in conflict with democratic culture is not unexpected. (Ibrahim & Kazah-Toure, 2003)

## 5.6 Religious Organizations

Participant 11 believes that, “religion has occasionally displayed disturbing anti-democratic tendencies that have found expression in religious violence and intolerance in the state”. The resultant effects are corruption and manipulation of religious leaders

Participant 12 argues that:

*Religious organizations in the state are to a large extent responsible for intolerance. Politicians use religious organizations in the state to garner support through churches and mosques. Party affiliations are in most cases based on religious lines for instance right from 1999 to date there are parties that are considered Hausa/Fulani Muslim parties like the ANPP, CPC, and APC, while the PDP which has membership across the state has the bloc support of the southern Christian minorities. Even the recent 2015 election that is what played out.*

In addition to the above Participant 6 believes that:

*Religious institutions like the Muslim Izala sect and the Christian Association of Nigeria play a major role in promoting political intolerance in the state. Promotion of candidates is actively pursued by the religious associations through various media based on the religious affiliation of the candidate.*

According to Participant 8:

*“Religion plays a significant role in who emerges as a contestant in elections. The issue of competence is less important. Campaigns are mounted at church and Mosque level first. CAN instructs the Christians to vote a particular candidate and the Muslim clerics do the same. If there is give and take there wouldn't be friction. The liberal Muslim or Christian is tagged rotten. So a Muslim candidate has to seek the support of the clerics and a Christian; the clergy.*

Stiff opposition against instituting the Sharia court of appeal at the federal level was championed by the northern minority tribes in the deliberations of the constituent

assemblies of the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s using CAN as their major organ for projecting their interests. (Osaghae, 1996).

### 5.7 Sectarianism

(Participant 8) says:

*Religion plays a significant role in who emerges as a contestant in elections. The issue of competence is less important. Campaigns are mounted at church and Mosque level first. CAN instructs the Christians to vote a particular candidate and the Muslim clerics do the same. If there is give and take there wouldn't be friction. The liberal Muslim or Christian is tagged rotten. So a Muslim candidate has to seek the support of the clerics and a Christian the clergy.*

There is the existence of sub-cleavages under Christian as well as under Muslim categories. These sects have been politically influential in their areas of preeminence. Over time they have been involved in conflicts within the major categories. Within the Christian category, denominations which include: the protestants (Methodist, Anglican, Lutheran, and Baptist), the evangelical Church of West Africa, the Jehovah's Witness, the Catholics etc. According to some accounts, the Pentecostal Churches are reckoned to be the denominations representing the extremist division of Christianity in Nigeria (cf. Udoidem, 1997), these have welcomed a significant percentage of youth crossing over from the older denominations.

The Ahmadiyya, Kadiriyya and Tijjaniyya sects are found within the Muslim category. The Jama'atu Nasril Islam which embraces all Muslim sects is an Umbrella organization which oversees the affairs of Muslims. It was formed in 1961 by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria. Sequel to

the establishment of a theocratic state. The spread of these groups precipitated the recurrence of religious conflicts in the North in the 1980s and 1990s. The pro-Muslim posture of the state which includes subsidy on a pilgrimage to Mecca and the membership of the Organization of Islamic Conference-OIC- was to a large extent responsible for the accentuation of Muslim identity. These crises had clear ethnic undertone as it involved mostly Muslims and Christians. Fracas also ensued between the mainstream Muslims and the Maitatsine movement, the Kadiryya Tijjaniyya sects, and the Shi'ites and Izala movements. These are sectarian conflicts that generate tension within the community.

## 5.8 Urban and Rural Tolerance Divide

Participant 10 argues that:

*religious leaders both Muslims and Christians are doing their best in emphasizing the need for mutual religious tolerance. There is a level of understanding where they live together in the same compound, go to the same market, school, etc most especially in urban areas and semi-urban communities. In fact, some give neighbors protection even during crisis*

While Participant 11 on the other hand says "in most villages, there are problems. Again, the moment there is any crisis, other people from neighboring states especially Plateau come to bring support thereby worsening the situation especially in villages".






Figure 5.2 Participants on influence of religion on political tolerance


## 5.9 Summary of the Chapter

The ethnoreligious configuration and the religious demography of Kaduna state in addition to the intense religiosity of the people set the stage for political intolerance as each religious faith has its political theology and orientation. The political class banking on the fundamental inflexibility of the religious adherents tends to manipulate the religious bodies into serving their selfish political objectives. The clerics indoctrinate and work their ignorant followers to frenzy so that they can execute any order usually premeditated by the politicians to achieve a set objective. Under the circumstances integrating the communities for any meaningful democratic process is highly unlikely.

## CHAPTER SIX

### HISTORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

#### 6.1 Influence Of Historical Relations And Cultural Diversity On Conflicts



*Figure 6.1* Histories and Political Culture

#### 6.2 Introduction

This chapter is going to look at social justice on the platform of the politics of recognition. Today the demand for social justice seems to have gone beyond the redistribution paradigm; the recognition paradigm, which is; the demand for recognition of cultural difference is the second. Social justice under this paradigm seeks to deconstruct social relations and neutralize the dominance of the cultural norms of the majority so that assimilation to same is no longer a requirement for equal respect. This claim is gaining momentum, so much that some political

philosophers are developing a new paradigm at the center of which is the recognition paradigm (Fraser, 1998).

### 6.3 Cultural Incongruity

The differences in cultural identity have for a long time been behind a number of ethnic crises in southern Kaduna. Participant 8 believes;

*The cultural identity of peoples especially in Africa revolves around traditional political institutions. Traditional African religion was and is still prevalent in southern Kaduna. Some Chiefs are traditional African religion adherents but they go to church as a façade. Magic, rituals during burial ceremonies, talking to spirits and appeasing them are some of the religious rites supposedly led by tribal chiefs. So where the traditional ruler is a Muslim, clearly there is a problem.*

That is why the first set of officials posted by the native authority around 1907, to the southern Kaduna as district heads elicited a number of peasant revolts in areas like Kachia. This Native authority staff was Hausa-Fulani Muslims (Kazah-Toure, 1995). The Zangon -Kataf minority tribes launched a protest against alleged discrimination and domination by the officials of the Native authority in 1942. The imposition of district heads from the Fulani dynastic rulers over a largely non-Fulani populace generated violent unrest among the Katafs and other minority groups in the zone around 1946-1966. They kicked against the oppressive nature of the emirate system (Suberu, 1996). Within these periods, the ethnic and political dimensions of the conflict were manifest but the religious coloration of the crises was not apparent.

The region viewed the Emirate and its Native Authority structure as an extension of colonialism. The traditional rulers were no better than the exploiter and oppressor colonial masters. The scenario was baffling as the Muslim Hausa-Fulani constitute a marginal minority in the region and the emirate system is incongruous with the

cultural diversity of the people of the region. It is no surprise, therefore, that the people despised colonial rule, despised the Hausa-Fulani rulers and the centralized political administration represented by the emirate system which was imposed on them. The following statement authored by the Kaduna state commission of inquiry set up to investigate a conflict in Jema'a emirate aptly describes the scene. “

*This community is made up of many tribes' and religious groups, but it is evident that the Christians far outweigh the Hausa –Fulani Muslims who constitute the minority. They worship many deities and are culturally diverse. Greater percentage view the emirate with disdain as it was imposed on them and the system was not in tune with their ways”.*

The existing arrangement, therefore, must be redesigned for the minority Hausa-Fulani to survive in the zone. (Suleiman, 2011)

#### 6.4 Culture of Impunity

The democratic dispensation seems to have given the people the impression that anyone can do what he wishes under democracy because of this notion of freedom.

Participant 4 posit that:

*The people seem to have a mindset. Before the democratic dispensation, there was peaceful co-existence, but the freedom of action under democracy has unleashed a behavior that was hitherto tamed and controlled and everybody seems to do whatever he wants with impunity.*

The elements within the populace responsible for the planning and execution of ethnic mayhem have somehow successfully evaded justice (Duruji, 2010). The weakness of the judiciary has been telling on the performance of justice as the trial of many who have been established to have been parties to the organization and execution of violence against some groups in the community have been scuttled. (Mu'azzam and Ibrahim 2000)

execution of violence against some groups in the community have been scuttled. (Mu`azzam and Ibrahim 2000)

Fletcher and Weinstein (2002) state that, rights advocacy groups and scholars have on numerous occasions encouraged governments to institute domestic trials of elements found wanting in the execution of mass murder of citizens. However, the democracies are not yet well grounded, the judiciaries are weak and the existence of amnesty laws inhibits the trials of suspects.

### **6.5 Elite Power Struggle**

As for participant 7:

There is the element of political culture which the north already had and the penchant for maintaining a leadership role which the south now contest having built a class of elites who are experienced in the field of governance, but proportionality is working against them.

Duruji, (2010) explains the struggle for political space by political elites is to get a foothold in the political arena in order to pursue in an advantaged position their economic objectives using ethnicity as a political tool. Groups are mobilized into action through the use of ethnic sentiments. The chief aim is to position themselves strategically to control the state and access its enormous resources (Ake, 1996; Obi, 2002) The elites act as the champions of the struggle for securing the portion of national cake accruing to the group.

Wallerstein (1979) believes that ethnicity is instrumental to the promotion of elite class interests. The major aim is to be able to dictate terms when it comes to resource

## 6.6 Ethnic Identity Politics

For a politician to be successful especially in a plural society like Nigeria, the appeal to ethnic sentiment is the order of the day. This follows the importance attached to indigeneity and the ethnicization of politics. Participant 10 is quoted as saying; “most tribes respect their elders and culture. For Gwari, Adara, Jaba, Baggi etc. people, one has to meet and convince their leaders in order to secure their support to contest elections”.

Participant 11 on the other hand, says;

*This is determined by the factor of indigene ship which is tied to the issue of land or ethnicity in the state politics. That is why today even ordinary appointment as a secondary school teacher at the state or local government service is tied to the issue of indigene ship and could also be affected or influenced by the ethnic or religious affiliation of the candidates.*

“The place of identity in politics is very important since it serves as the basis of inclusion and exclusion” (Harris and Williams, 2003)

### 6.6.1 Dominant Zazzau

Participant 5 says

*the history of southern Kaduna has been one of servitude to the emirate of Zazzau. No community wants to be dominated by another of equal status. In colonial days their hegemony was enforced by the colonial police, so the beneficiaries of colonial power relationship then want to maintain the status quo, while the southern Kaduna people encouraged by their elites want to change the power relations.*

That accounts for the agitations for autonomy by creating chiefdoms so that they are no longer answerable to the Zazzau emirate. Awoniyi (2013) views it from the politics of resource allocation and control. This may not be unconnected to the nature



of Nigerian politics which is organized around the distribution of resources and not around production.

### 6.7 Historical Power Relations

(Participant 1) recounts a narration by a prominent 1st republic politician (Wada Nas) who said:

*the southern Nigeria politicians unable to penetrate the north and secure votes began to placate the northern Christian minority to align with the southern politicians in order to defeat the Northern people's congress (NPC). So being ethnic minorities in the north as well as Christians, they were wooed by the southern politicians.*

(Participant 12) opines that;

*The historical power relations between the Hausa/Fulani in the North and the southern Kaduna minority tribes have contributed towards the formation of political opinion of the southern minority tribes. While the north wants to maintain the status quo, the south wants a complete restructuring of the power relations having been emancipated by the democratization process. Every tribe hitherto under the authority of the Zazzau emirate now agitates for autonomy, the award of which has engendered relative peace in the region.*

(Participant 7) say

*Southern Kaduna was not politically active before the coming of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC). It was the then premier of northern Nigeria who first began to socialize southern Kaduna politically. There is the element of political culture which the north already had and the penchant for maintaining a leadership role.*

In addition to the historical power relations in southern Kaduna, the under-currents of Nigeria's socio-economic development which include; employment, industrialization, provision of amenities in towns, cities and villages and education need to be studied in order to understand the reasons for ethnic- religious conflicts.

The interplay of Youth unemployment and rural poverty in addition to poor infrastructural development, are some of the remote triggers of social unrest in Southern Kaduna (Suleiman, 2011)

### 6.7.1 Recognition

(Participant 9) says:

*A big gap was created following the failure of the Northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims who first started political socialization in the south to integrate them or recognize them as different and accord them equal status. This in no small measure influences the political behavior of the southern Kaduna people. They register their protest at the slightest opportunity.*

In developed democracies, citizens' rights are enshrined in the constitutions as is known with liberal and democratic culture, but in the developing world, groups agitate for rights to be recognized as different. In other words, they want to be autonomous from any other cultural group. — (Mamdani, 2000). The objective of cultural self-determination has been achieved when 22 chiefdoms were created after the 2000 crises in order to mitigate conflicts, but this generated another conflict in the appointment of neo-customary rulers. The communities have gained the desired recognition, but conversely, the community has been fragmented and their neo-customary rulers have been sidelined by the more powerful emirs. (Angerbrandt, 2015)

### 6.7.2 Regional Politics

(Participant 1) recounts a narration by a prominent 1<sup>st</sup> republic politician (Wada Nas) who said:



*The southern politicians unable to penetrate the north and secure votes began to placate the northern Christian minority to align with the southern politicians in order to defeat the Northern people's congress (NPC). So being ethnic minorities in the north as well as Christians, they were wooed by the southern politicians.*

In 1959 when the federal elections were in top gear, the NPC, and the AG were contesting for a foothold in the middle belt through the support of the Tiv. The United middle Belt Congress (UMBC) was a political party led by Joseph Tarka and which was courted by the NPC from the North and the AG from the south. The Tarka led UMBC aligned with the AG to oust the NPC because of its hostility towards the APC considered to be a Hausa-Fulani party. The alliance was based on ethnic prejudice against the Hausa-Fulani. Tarka promised to work towards realizing a state in which the middle-belt will be free of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony (Onapajo, 2013).

#### 6.8 Political Exclusion

(Participant 5) says:

*even after the creation of chiefdoms their political opinions have not shifted ie. Political positions are still guided by our historical antecedents. The politics of exclusion has to do with the question of indigenous rights to land for agricultural purposes as Nigeria is mainly an agrarian society. The second reason is to corner for the indigenes of the community all opportunities for political appointments at local, state or federal government. This generates unhealthy rivalries and violent confrontations among differentiated groups.*

The politics of affinity, therefore, takes the center stage. Ethnic identity, therefore, becomes a salient feature of Nigerian socio-political milieu and indigeneity takes precedence over National citizenship. This primordial sentiment has led to very

costly and long-running battles between and within communities; for instance, the Ife/Modakeke conflict, which has been recurring for over a century now.

The Hausa/Fulani Muslim minorities in southern Kaduna are seen as settlers and hence are denied citizenship rights by the predominantly Christian heterogeneous communities, while on the other hand the Hausa/Fulani assert an equal claim to both land and citizenship rights since a sizeable percentage of them can trace their history of settlement three hundred years back. The jema'a emirate though is still intact because the long existence of the institution is irrefutable. (Suleiman, 2011)

In their drive towards the objective of exclusive access to the political and economic resources of the area, the southern Kaduna communities have been agitating for the creation of new chiefdoms so they can systematically edge out the 'strangers'. What defies logic, however, is the fact that as minorities in Kaduna state, the southern Kaduna tribes have been battling for emancipation from the same ethnic group they are trying to dispossess by all means of what they are struggling for (citizenship rights) (Suleiman 2011)

## **6.9 Religious Manipulation**

(Participant I) opines that:

*The ethno-regional political competition of the first republic laid the foundation for the current religious manipulation in order to achieve political objectives even if it is at the expense of social and democratic stability. The existence of a sizable percentage of Christian population in the North central districts gave the southern politicians the opportunity to use religion to win their support.*

The extant complex cleavages (ethnic, religious and regional) have been to the political elites the tools with which to manipulate the political process in order to compete on favorable grounds the result of which has in most cases been conflicts in Nigeria. (Nnoli 1978, Dudley 1973). There is no rational motif for rallying behind a religious identity in a political contest for power in Nigeria (Natufe, 2001) instead it is rather to appease religion Amadi (2003). Nigerians have become so habituated to religion on account of which they can sacrifice the stability of the society. It is the fluid nature of political domination as the political elites compete for power and state resources that induces the fear and suspicion among the less advantaged political units in the country. (Ibrahim and Kazah-Toure, 2003).

#### 6.10 Social Exclusion

(Participant 12) "Religion is only a fault line used to segregate communities".

(Participant 9) asks whether we have political tolerance in Kaduna. He says:

*The state has the history of ethnic, political and religious crises. Prior to 1992 Zango crises, there were mixed settlements in Kaduna, but after that there were demarcations. So bars, night clubs have been expunged to Rigasa the settlement of Christians. After the Sharia conflict, there was a complete demarcation. So generally where people cannot cohabit, there could hardly be political tolerance.*

The precolonial conquest of a number of tribes in southern Kaduna which generated and still generates uncordial relationship is further heightened by the refusal of the Hausa/ Fulani rulers to integrate with the populations constituting the conquered territory. Instead, each maintained a culturally distinct identity which rendered them socially exclusive. In addition the British conquest of the southern Kaduna tribes

further reinforced the hegemony of the Hausa/Fulani over the tribes and a further social gulf between them (Suleiman,2011)




Figure 6.2 Participants on cultural diversity and political behavior

### 6.11 Mutual Coexistence




Figure 6.3 Mutual coexistence

The Sokoto Caliphate and the British had to contain resistance from Kaduna in the course of colonial adventure. Pockets of resistance were encountered from Kaduna by the Sokoto caliphate and later the British colonizers. The middle belt bound drive of the emirate system was also halted in Kaduna. Kazah-Toure (1991) observed that ethnic relations took a turn for the worse when the British further consolidated the position of the emirate system in southern Kaduna. The emirate system and its institutions were imposed on the minority groups who did not hide their distaste for them. The British for the sake of convenience commissioned the emirate system of the Hausa/Fulani into the colonial framework because of its centralized political system.

#### **6.11.1 Deconstruct Social Relations**

(Participant 4) argues that.

*The state should be redesigned but it is difficult because the southern Kaduna want Kaduna metropolis to fall within their region much as Kaduna North also want to lay claim to it. It is the most developed urban center with social amenities and infrastructure, employment opportunities because of industries. But the idea is still in the pipeline.*

(Participant 8) says “The issue generally as far as I am concerned has to do with fairness in the distribution of amenities and sensitization.”

Secession or partition are reckoned to be no viable solutions to ethnic conflicts, because each has its downsides and rather than allow conflicts to burn out which should not be contemplated owing to its high cost in terms of human lives; the existing social relations should be restructured to accommodate conflicting interests and fashion out a more inclusive strategy that will incorporate everyone in decision-

### 6.11.2 Demarcation Irreversible

(Participant 9) opines that:

*Categorically people prefer to part ways. Religion is dominant, the old days of Burkutu (local brew), night clubs are over and cannot be accepted back now. Going by this it is unpopular. In a way, it could be a partial implementation of Sharia which the southern Kaduna people vehemently fought against. So this is an achievement as far as the Muslims are concerned.*

### 6.11.3 Demarcation Desirable

Participant 11 explained that:

*The idea of mutual coexistence in Kaduna depends on the pattern of inter-ethnic and religious relations. At the political level, there was periodic tension generated by the competition for power and the control of the natural resources."*

Similarly, participant 12 support the argument when he says that:

*I think it is apparent. One can see that from the demarcation of Kaduna metropolis and the recurrent hostilities between the indigenous tribes of southern Kaduna and the Hausa/Fulani settler population. Creating a new state is desirable, though complex and difficult. But for us to develop we need our own state.*

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Considering the transient nature of both territorial and ethnic cleavages forming the pivot on which the agitation for state creation revolves and the accompanying largesse from the federal resources, the demand for state creations may never cease in Nigeria. (Edewor et al, 2014)

The arbitrary demarcation of territories and people into incongruent groups by the Colonial powers saw the emergence of states that had entrenched in them the seeds of turmoil in Africa. The withdrawal of the colonial powers was followed by a perpetual order of disputes that still linger.

These struggles for self-determination are not peculiar to Africa; Western Europe has seen the reenactment of ancient conflicts among formerly independent people like the Catalonians, Scots, Sicilians and the Bretons. They struggled for greater inclusion or greater self-determination from the pervasive influence of states in the 1970s. Identity markers like distinct cultures, historical background, Language, differentiated ethnicity, and religion are used by such groups to delineate their uniqueness from the dominant group. The group's concentration in one geographical area in addition to their claim for distinctiveness they argue earns them the right to special consideration. Their claims only confirm that they harbor a political agenda which is evidence of their discontent with the existing political arrangement. What needs to be further interrogated is whether discriminatory treatment invariably precedes a group's separatist sentiment. It is not always a prerequisite for groups to have been treated differently by the state to justify their claim for autonomy. When the group's political aspirations are not attained, they pursue differential treatment with vigor (Gurr, 1989).

#### **6.11.4 Kaduna Still Insecure**

As recently as December 2016 there were reported cases of the murder of many people in southern Kaduna the reason for which has not yet been established.

(Participant 9) says "The existence of security committees in all parts of the state has not made Kaduna state any safe". Kaduna which is sighted at the northern fringes of the Christian population is prone to violent hostilities intermittently due to its sizable percentage of indigenous Muslim and Christian populations. With a bureaucratic social organization; Kaduna has an obvious presence of government offices,



. Kaduna which is sighted at the northern fringes of the Christian population is prone to violent hostilities intermittently due to its sizable percentage of indigenous Muslim and Christian populations. With a bureaucratic social organization; Kaduna has an obvious presence of government offices, industrial establishments and organized formal sector workers associations. Due to the Muslim-Christian ratio of the population, there is a high prospect for religious polarization with greater chances of religious violence. The enthronement of Shari'a by twelve northern Nigerian states in 1999 saw the rise of violent hostilities between the two religious communities leading to a growing partition of hitherto cohesive communities. Each of the religious communities has withdrawn to a safe enclave; Muslims to Kaduna North Local Government Area, while the Christians have drifted towards Kaduna South LGA. (Meagher, 2013)

#### 6.11.5 Kaduna Is Indivisible

(Participant 3) is of the opinion that:

*New states are desired but creating one is a complex affair. Kaduna metropolis is central to the problem. Each wants to have Kaduna as its capital city and Kaduna is under the Zazzau emirate, unfortunately, Kaduna metropolis being host to very influential leaders of northern establishment can hardly be given to southern Kaduna because it has all the industrial establishments, social amenities, infrastructure etc. so whoever takes Kaduna would have taken more than a fair share.*

(Participant4)

*wants the state to be redesigned but it is difficult because the southern Kaduna want Kaduna metropolis to fall within their region much as Kaduna North also want to lay claim to it. It is the most developed urban center with social amenities and infrastructure and employment opportunities because of industries.*



#### 6.11.6 Maintain Status Quo

(Participant 6) says:

*As a minority Hausa Fulani Muslim from Southern Kaduna, I would prefer the status quo. This is because the issue of indigene is going to haunt me and my family for the rest of my life. But generally, people on both sides of the divide are for dismembering the state.*

#### 6.11.7 Partition The State

(Participant 1) says: "Partitioning the state is still popular for both communities."

while (Participant 2) maintains that "the Greater percentage would prefer the creation of a state each for the north and south" and (Participant 5) says "to divide the state is better. We pretend to live as brothers but our minds are already poisoned. There is no point living together. It will never be the same again." (Participant 7), however is of the opinion that;

*From their agitation, one would conclude the south want to be on their own. For them to develop they have to be on their own. Integrating them is very difficult. So the idea of co-existence is not popular among the people.*

(Participant 9) says "categorically people prefer to part ways."

Grievances of multiple ethnic groups that have been in check over time seem to have been woken with the democratic process in place. The ethnic rivalries have resurfaced to even surpass what was hitherto manageable. The struggle is two pronged; while some ethnic groups are struggling for inclusion into the political scheme of the Nigerian state, others are pushing for greater control over their sphere of influence. On many occasions, groups tend to engage their fellow citizens in an orgy of violence to balance up on a previous offense. (Omuabor, as cited in agbiboa, 2013).




Figure 6.4 Participants on Mutual coexistence

## 6.12 Summary of The Chapter

Sequel to the connection of indigeneity to the eligibility of one to access benefits from the national, state, and local authorities through section 14(3) of the 1979 and 1989 constitutions as amended, the state has inadvertently sanctioned the marginalization of groups who cannot trace their descent to any indigenous community within the area in question. The contextual malady in tune with the historical power relations ignites and accelerates the agitations for autonomy from a perceived dominant oppressor group, citing cultural incongruity as justification for recognition or autonomy. For ethno-religious harmony and democracy to be stable all social cleavages must be subsumed and democratic ideals take precedence.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The study attempts to explore the impact of ethnoreligious conflicts on democratic stability focusing on how social justice and political tolerance inform the recurrence and escalation of violent hostilities between citizens of different ethnic and religious groups. Consequent upon this, the objectives are outlined thus:

- Determine whether religion and ethnicity influence justice in Kaduna state.
- Identify the impact of ethnicity and religion on political tolerance.
- Explore the influence of history and culture of the people on their political behavior.

The qualitative technique and the in-depth interview as the instrument of data collection were used to obtain information adequate enough to explain the phenomenon under study. Boyce and Neale (2006) support the use of in-depth interviews where the objective of a study is a deeper understanding of a subject matter.

The structural conflict theory and the psycho-cultural theory of conflict were used as the guiding frameworks for the study. In addition to that, relevant literature is gleaned from secondary sources to buttress findings in interviews.

## 7.2 Influence of Justice on Ethno-religious Conflicts

In the course of this study, efforts were made to determine the influence of ethnicity and religion on justice which is considered as one of the unexplored triggers of ethnic violence in Kaduna state. The insight gained from the interviews on theme one include five sub-themes and three sub-sub- themes which are discussed in order of presentation.

The manipulation of ethnicity and religion for exclusive political objectives usually act as the precursor to injustice which is manifested in corruption, marginalization, nepotism and discrimination which eventually leads to confrontations between interest group usually referred to as ethno-religious conflicts.

The study establishes that one of the most debilitating problems of most states today; democratic or non-democratic is corruption. It affects negatively every sector of a society. A number of people interviewed have lamented how public office holders turn public property into their personal estates, jettisoning their responsibilities as accounting officers on how common resources of the society are managed and put to public use.

The allusion to the customary mutual exchange in gift Wilson (1991) or the burden of the extended family (Barkow, 1980) therefore, does not proffer a cogent explanation for corrupt practices in Africa. Rather the evolving political culture conceived and propagated by the nationalists in their decolonization struggle that the state was not a legitimate political entity and that to usurp the resources of the state is morally right was the basis of the instrumentalist idea of African politics under

colonialism. Corruption and other indices of amoral politics in Africa, therefore, are better explained by the historical understanding of the instrumentalist. Structural theorists particularly Ross (1993) argues that when one group monopolizes the socio-economic and political resources of society it is a strong signal to disaffection. Diamond in explaining post-colonial conflict in Nigeria believes it was generated as a result of the emergence of a class of people who transmute political power into an opportunity to corner the resources of state for themselves. (Osaghae, 1995) In line with the above, politics of material acquisition associated with backward societies is attributable to the existence of amoral familism in such societies Banfield suggests. In a competitive political sphere, the tendency is for people to join politics so long as there is the prospect of material acquisition for oneself or community. In amoral familist societies, the corporate interest of state or community gives way to private interest (Banfield, 1967: 83-84)

Under the circumstances therefore the rule of law as a critical element of democracy is compromised by political corruption. This is because it distorts and subverts the democratic processes, as well as weakens the governmental legitimacy in addition to flouting important democratic ideals of tolerance and trust. Once the legitimacy of a government is questioned, the effective use of coercive instruments is weakened and miscreants find the needed opportunity to push the society into ethnic conflicts (Okaduwa, as cited in Straub, Adebajoko and Okorie 2014).

The French oil company Elf (now Total), Italian Snambrogetti and USKBR, filial of Halliburton, Thales the French electronic group, French firm Alcatel, Inabensa the Spanish electric equipment provider and Ericsson the Swedish telecommunication

company were at various times reported to have bribed top government officials including Presidents of Nigeria and Gabon to secure contracts in telecommunications or oil and gas in many countries (Straub, 2004).

Political corruption breeds so many vices in the society including discrimination. There is the tendency of people in positions of authority to discriminate in favor of people who they share some affinity with. Socio-political activities are consummated on religious and ethnic lines. Some participants have voiced their concerns over discriminatory attitudes of some security and judicial personnel on how they treat citizens other than their tribesmen.

Societal discrimination on account of differences in culture is reckoned to be the mechanism responsible for ethnic conflicts as posited by the modernists. It is believed that grievances are formed due to discrimination which leads to rebellion. Ordinarily, democratic regimes tend to prune down discriminatory and repressive tendencies because of cultural differences. Since the people are enabled to vote politicians out of office, dictatorships do not thrive. The existence of civic rights like freedom of expression, association and due process negates repression and thus trim grievances. Minority grievances manifest in states with policies that discriminate along the line of some group's religion or other primordial features. Ethnic conflicts are also associated with states that have high economic inequality (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

Discriminations invariably take the form of deprivations to groups other than that of the persons in authority. They tend to favor relatives against others who are not kin

to their group. It is the existence of such cleavages and the common disposition to the kin selection that leads to conflict. Where citizens are extended unmerited and sometimes unsolicited favors from officials (nepotism) Justice has effectively been compromised. In his attempt to explain ethnic influence on justice Participant 10 referred to the local adjudication of cases by traditional rulers (mai'unguwa, dagaci, Hakimi) who in a greater percentage of cases favor their tribesmen were two conflicting parties are from different tribes. Participant 11, on the other hand, see favoritism in who gets what benefit from the state as responsible for the incessant conflicts. Participants (2 and 3) in line with participant 11 say that people in positions of authority tend to reserve appointments and favorable postings to their cronies.

Vanhanen sees Ethnic groups as extended families. People who share common cultural interests tend to exclude others in areas of common concern because of the filial relationship between them. In any conflict situation, ethnicity tends to reinforce the commitment to secure the common interest of the group; as such support need not even be solicited. The disposition to kin selection extends to large religious, national, linguistic and some other primordial issues. The term 'ethnic nepotism' therefore explains kin relationship at the extended group level. (Vanhanen, 1991).

When citizens are discriminated against and kin selection takes precedence over merit, it leads to the marginalization of disadvantaged groups. Nigeria has been battling with the issue of group's marginalization. Incidentally virtually every group in Nigeria cries of marginalization. In Kaduna state, the subordinate groups feel marginalized because they lack access to power and state resources while the

dominant group feels marginalized because the minority group has more than a fair share of representation in government because of educational imbalance.

To explain this, participants had offered a myriad of observations in the study. While participant 1 argues that there is no marginalization as appointments to public offices are on a proportionate basis, participant 5 believes that the southern Kaduna people are marginalized in terms of employment and infrastructural facilities. Participant 6 in his opinion says all parts of the states are marginalized even though he comes from southern Kaduna. His observation is that Kaduna metropolis is the only city that sees any form of development. Participant 8, on the other hand, looks at it from the proportionate distribution of benefits angle and argues that the laid down procedure for employment of citizens is jettisoned by politicians.

Comparatively, while citizens in developed democracies tend to enjoy political rights in spite of diversities, some countries notably developing democracies like African nations rights are a matter of patronage because diversity is in most cases a state policy; accepted through an authoritarian policy of integration. Under the circumstances, the constituent groups are pitted against each other and against the state in crises of ethnic nationalism. The minority groups find themselves in a lower position of citizenship; their political, economic, social and cultural rights denied. Depending upon the capacity of the subordinate group; they either accept or resist, sometimes through violent means. State response to civil strife involving two groups reflects how marginalized a group is.



African states find themselves in serious turmoil as a result of the contradictions associated with citizenship rights and ethnic disenchantment with marginalization. Therefore to ignore ethnicity in nation building is a perilous venture, but on the other hand to give ethnicity an important place leads to ethnic polarization. (Deng, 2000)

Usman following the lead believes that diversity is not an invariable cause of disunity. It's been there throughout history and has been more common to political units than homogeneity. Heterogeneity is, in fact, a plus to political units as it favors political, economic, social and cultural progress. The problem is the role these distinctions come to play in the political system. The political role of heterogeneity is determined by the operations of the economic and social structures of a particular country. (Usman, 1987)

Going by Usman's position; all things being equal there should not be any settler/indigene dichotomy. The constitutional provision which sanctioned the eligibility of citizens to enjoy citizenship rights is instrumental to making the indigene/ settler dichotomy a thorny issue. This has to a large extent denied many Nigerians access to the resources of society like land for agricultural and other meaningful purposes which has led to many avoidable costly confrontations between indigenes and settlers of certain areas.

Participant 9 describes as worrisome the nature of deliberate deprivation of settlers of basic rights both in the North and southern Kaduna on account of having come from states other than Kaduna. In some pathetic cases, some cannot trace their origins as their ancestors have been there for generations. Some may have been there for two

centuries. This is evident because some emirates in southern Kaduna were established in 1810 around the time of the Islamic Jihad.

Deng holds the view that some Africans could emancipate themselves from the bond of ethnicity to live by the general laws of the state. Citizens though lived under the dual legal system which continued even after colonialism when cultural stratification was no longer tenable ie. When tracing one's descent to a particular ethnic group was no longer a requirement for civic citizenship. He says, the Civil law may have been introduced to all citizens after colonialism, but the rural areas have not been severed from the Native Authority which was in control of local administration. This perhaps informs the clamor for the creation of chiefdoms in Kaduna state. In the political domain, civil rights were still individual rights but customary rights remained as group rights accessible only to ethnic group members. As the peasant was closer to land as their source of livelihood, customary rights became more important than civic rights (Deng, 2000).

This perhaps is why the relations between settlers and natives or indigenes and non-indigenes in post-colonial Africa depict the dynamics of power struggle and competition for natural resources (Mamdani, 2000) The struggle to capture resources and state power among groups becomes a conflict of identity the intent of which is to exclude other groups or include them according to their political worth. Where the subordinate groups are dissatisfied with the existing arrangement, they demand for restructuring the power relations, request the decentralization of power or start agitating for self-determination (Deng, 2000).

The demand for self-determination by communities in Kaduna state has been on for some time. The agitation tends to believe that Kaduna has a bigger role as the political center of the North as such belongs to the Northern political elites. The political importance of Kaduna and its position as an economic hub of the country has made it attractive to migrants from many parts of northern Nigeria and even beyond. It makes the city complex in terms of demographic structure. In addition to that, the political bigwigs of the North consider Kaduna their second home as most political decisions concerning the North is made in the city. Traditional rulers also convene meetings in Kaduna as the former Political nucleus of the North to dialogue on issues of political significance.

Participant 6 highlights how the city of Kaduna has become unwieldy for even state governors because of the presence of big political players in the city. He believes that is why infrastructural developments are concentrated in Kaduna to the detriment of other political units in the state.

That is why Kaduna has grown exponentially in terms of population from 20,000 in 1948 to 149,000 in 1960 (Oyedele, as cited in Angerbrandt, 2015). Political developments in the colony led to the creation of three regions as political units and Kaduna was made the administrative center of the Northern region. Today it is the third largest in population with about six million people going by the 2006 census. The withdrawal of the British from active governance and the gradual handover of political power to the indigenous political elites coupled with programs that aided the rapid development of governmental activities gave rise to employment opportunities of public servants. According to Andræ and Beckman (1998:87), Kaduna eventually

became the political power base of the bureaucratic elites who were the appendages of the emirate system.

The government embarked on infrastructure provision complimented by foreign investments in the manufacturing sector; an automobile assembly plant and oil refinery was also floated at a later stage. (Andrae and Beckman 1998:89-90). Migrants, especially from the North, began to stream into Kaduna to avail themselves of employment opportunities. Kaduna came second after Lagos in political importance. They were then the two major political power axis in Nigeria accommodating the most influential political elements in the Northern region. Kaduna also became the passage by which people move from one part of the country to another. (Paden, 1986:315) The cosmopolitan nature of Kaduna coupled with its position in Nigerian political arena makes it indispensable in the national politics. The political turmoil leading to the Nigerian civil war of 1967 necessitated the creation of six states out of the northern region which marked the beginning of the decline of Kaduna as a significant political player in Nigerian politics. (Andrae and Beckman 1998:89-90). The proximity of Kaduna to the current capital city Abuja does not diminish the symbolic importance of the city. North central state was carved out of the Northern region in the political reorganization of the federation in 1967 and Kaduna retained the status of the capital city even after being renamed Kaduna state in 1976. The state was further divided into two by creating Katsina state in 1987. Retired generals and former heads of state still maintain a presence in the city.

The mutual suspicion therefore among the communities competing for power and control within the state has undermined the zeal of the political actors to work

cohesively towards the attainment of corporate objectives of the state. Instead sabotage and recurrent animosity among the citizens makes the state always prone to ethno-religious conflicts. It is evident by this therefore that ethnic conflicts have to a significant extent been triggered by corruption, marginalization, nepotism and discrimination.

### **7.3 Influence of Religion on Justice**

At the center of most ethnoreligious crises is in most cases the issue of how religion is manipulated to deny other groups justice. It is the attempt to edge out competing groups in the struggle for power and societal resources. This invariably leads to mobilization of subordinate groups to rebel in the course of which conflicts arise.

In their responses to questions on the influence of religion on justice; Participants 1,3 4 6,10 and 11 hold the view that both the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in northern Kaduna and the minority Christian tribes of southern Kaduna have formed themselves into formidable exclusive political units. Their political platforms are always at variance. At every round of election, there are Hausa/Fulani political parties usually associated with the northern establishments and any other party constituting an opposition to the party predominantly drawing its membership from the Muslim majority in the state which the Christian minority tribes pitch camp with.

Religion as a veritable tool for mobilization played a critical role in resource allocation. Y B Usman explains, using the religious manipulation thesis, those religious dynamics in Nigeria are blown out of proportion and that confessional conflicts are provoked as part of a wider strategy to acquire political influence and

/or for enhancing the assets of those involved in the process of power brokerage. He further asserts that the intermediate bourgeoisie is behind the numerous religious upheavals in Nigeria since 1977 as a result of their manipulations. This is to obscure to the masses their deft hands in exploitation. He cited the Kafanchan crises which reached a certain level owing to the manipulative role of certain political elites.

Coulon agrees with Usman but highlights the inadequacy of the manipulation thesis in explaining why the people always fall for the manipulation ploy of the elites. He maintains that the religious arena provides meaning for a wide group of actors by constituting an ideological space with symbols, morality, aesthetics, historical references and codes of action in which dominant and non-dominant classes and groups engage in cultural negotiations. On the understanding that religious space means much more than manipulation by dominant groups, the recurrent nature of series of conflicts that trail political transition periods makes the hidden hands of men no longer obscure.

Politicians have always been quick to reorganize Muslims and Christians into two neat camps for easy exploitation especially during the transitional periods. Preparatory to second republic handover of political power to civilian administration in 1977/78, the two religious camps were pitted against each other, either strongly in support of or strongly opposed to the creation of Shari'a court of appeal. This was also replayed in 1987/88 when the country was warming up for the third republic. Internal schisms were subsumed within the two camps in order to conserve their forces against each other.

This kind of ecumenical strategy is promoted by political entrepreneurs who hope to gain dividends from religiously consolidated constituencies. The danger of this divisiveness is that once these passionate forces are unleashed they are beyond restraint. The centrifugal forces which act as checks against each other are now well tacked into two mutually exclusive primordial camps. To edge out those who prefer compromise and progress, these mutually exclusive camps are mobilized and the destructive forces take the political terrain.

In developed democracies like the United States religiously based political conflicts have no prospects. This is because studies have shown that religious or political issues are not potent enough to split the public into two conflicting parties. Even where the political agenda of the two great camps (conservative and liberals) seem to be aligned with religion, neither side is geared towards opposing the program of the other. The only thing worthy of notice is that religious-political conflict does not go beyond debates about the conservative social moral agenda. Therefore attempts to enlist the support of the public on religious grounds are going to be futile. Religious beliefs seem to be insulated against pragmatic political issues.

In Nigeria the struggle for political power is unregulated. Any strategy can be used to attain the political objective including religion and ethnicity. The Northern minority groups including the southern Kaduna have been struggling to wrest power from their traditional antagonists the Hausa/Fulani who have been perceived to be dominating and retarding their development. Participants 5 and 12 say religions could be useful in making politicians accountable. It could also be used to maintain self in power or else use religion to frustrate the effort of an opponent.

The resentment for the Islamization of the North is used as a ploy to garner support for their political objectives. Obianyo strongly believes that the Nigerian minority tribes including the southern Kaduna tribes are very close to offsetting the hegemony of the majority ethnic groups who have been dominating the positions of power right from independence. In his fourth force thesis, he believes conditions are ripe for the minority to change the current political equation currently in operation in the country. The marginalization of the minority groups by their majority counterparts commonly experienced; States creation, the ongoing constitutional engineering and electoral reforms, as well as the gradual inroads of the minority into the political arena are the necessary conditions that give the minorities the requisite advantage to wriggle them into the Nigerian power structure.

The Northern minority who he believes are the worst marginalized in Nigeria are struggling to emancipate themselves from the bondage of the Hausa/Fulani. Middle belt seems to be the preferred identity of the Northern minorities. As they are predominantly Christian they resent the “Islamization” drive of the Hausa/Fulani. That perhaps account for the incessant religious conflicts in Kaduna state. The creation of states has made some of the minorities majorities in many states. In time they will get to know how powerful they are. If the 371 ethnic minorities can mobilize themselves into a political force; the face of Nigerian politics would be greatly affected. (Obianyo, 2012). A narrative like this from an academic could serve to influence the political thoughts of many in the middle belt albeit the direction of influence can hardly be determined as the area is already replete with violent attacks on innocent citizens further aggravated by newspaper reports that are unmindful of the ethics of journalism.



This struggle for power is the outcome of the discovery of oil which became the chief revenue earner of the economy and which had made productive activities unattractive. The forces of production have been underutilized as easy money is streaming in from the oil sector coupled with the unfettered access to the resources of the state by the ruling class. Participant 8 says everyone is jostling for political power because it is the key to controlling state resources.

Scholars trace this trend to the struggle to decolonize when the nationalists made promises of improved welfare to the people as such on assumption of power, resources were centrally controlled and distribution of benefits on identity basis. This made the competition for power-intense. Added to this is the prospect of access to a large amount of rent derivable from oil revenue. Ake characterizes this struggle as a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and loser loses everything (Ake 1996:7). Power became an end in itself. To win and keep power is a game that knows no rules. In other words, there are no observable standards for the acquisition of power. He sees politics in Nigeria as a fierce contest to capture and privatize an enormous source of power.

The state does not organize productive process because revenues accruing to the state are not through productive activities. The revenue source for the state, therefore, is responsible for the plunder of the resources of the state and the projection of identity in the contest for political power. This is what subjects the economy to external control. That is the weak economy that is dependent on revenue from the sale of the primary product. The ruling class also enrich themselves through the rent accruable to the state thus neglecting the virtue of productivity. The relationship between one's

wealth and any productive activity is questionable. Individuals' preoccupation is in most cases accessing the state resources. (Beblawi and Luciani as cited in Ibrahim 2003:53). Wealth that is the result of a systematic, organized production process is jettisoned for access, chance or opportunity. (Beblawi, as cited in Ibrahim 2003:53). The conflict between rentier and production ethics becomes apparent. That is why provision of public goods is not guaranteed because resources are not from taxation as such the people can hardly take the government to task. To that extent the state has become what (Luciani as cited in Ibrahim, 2003:53) called an allocation (as distinct from a production) state.

In an effort to capture political power, attempts are made by certain political interest groups from the south to ostracize a certain group in the North using the media unnecessarily heating the political environment. The Vanguard newspaper and the Guardian have been carrying media reports that could incite violence and create instability in the North.

The study sampled some of the media reports thus:

The guardian, January 6, 2017 reported that killings in southern Kaduna have been consistent and sustained and the reasons proffered ranged from Islamization, Fulani domination agenda, inequity and conquest and that the entire middle belt including southern Kaduna have been victims of the killer herdsmen.

Motivated by their selfish drive to exacerbate instability in specific regions, news media give different accounts of happenings in conflict-ridden zones. Newspapers have been the tools used by certain interest groups to dictate the direction of crises

(Adebanwi 2007). The newspapers give the narrations of crucial actors and thereafter write on events that serve the interest of the analyst. Most influential newspapers and news magazines have their bases in the southern Nigeria and more disposed to reporting the views of Christians and ethnic groups other than the Hausa/Fulani. These papers include Guardian, The Punch, This Day and Vanguard, which, for example, were highly critical of sharia implementation. Only one paper in the north bears the Islamic perspective in reporting any crises. The paper is the daily trust established in Kaduna but is now headquartered in Abuja though still giving coverage to events in the north. Different actors are given different weight in the newspapers, and it has been important to take this into account in assessing the reportage. (Angerbrandt, 2015).

Previous studies have recognized that the crises in Kaduna had an impact on national ethnic and religious relations, but this has seldom been scrutinized beyond connecting specific events to incidents in other places. Harris (2013) is an exception. She argues in a study of violence in Kaduna city that local, national and international factors have become interwoven. She regards local ethnically based politics as being on the basis of the conflict and argues that religion was employed as a tool by actors to nationalize the conflict and mobilize more groups. (Angerbrandt, 2015).

Evidences from participants and facts gleaned from literature point to the significant influence of religious manipulation on the dispensation of justice which eventually leads to ethno-religious conflicts.

#### **7.4 Influence of Religion on Political Tolerance**

Religious organizations are supposed to be moderating influences and not catalytic influences to any form of intolerance. In Nigeria, they seem to have been instrumental to most religious conflicts. Participants 6,8,11 &12 share the same belief that religious organizations are behind most issues of political intolerance.

Fox (2002) classifies such conflicts as ethno-religious conflicts reference to Gurr's (2000) minorities at risk data set. Toft (2007) reports incidences of such conflicts from 1940 to 2000 in which he states that in 133 civil wars, 42 or 32% were religious and going by Fox (2002) report, out of 268 ethnic conflicts 105 or 39% were religious. Conflicts that had to do with religion progressively increased in recurrence from 19% in the 1940s to 50% in 2000 (Toft, 2006).

Nigeria has been part of this trend for decades. Religious strife has been ripe since independence. Northern Nigeria was the first to suffer the most casualties in the January 1966 coup in which the Premier of Northern Nigeria and the then Prime Minister of the federation who were both Muslims and from the north were murdered. A number of writers have shown the role played by Religion to be significant. In his autobiography, Abubakar Gumi an Islamic scholar who is believed to have been close to the Premier was also to have been killed but for want of reason as he was not a politician. He indicted the coup plotters as anti-Islamists. Later statements credited to the Igbo leaders was that Igbo land was the only place 'not tainted' by Islam. (Gumi and Tsiga, 1992: 123).

The Gideon Orkar coup that attempted to excise five Muslim states from the federation in 1990 has disabused the minds of everyone when in the preamble of the coup speech he states that: We wish to emphasize that this is not just another coup but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the marginalized, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle-Belt and the South [Christians] with a view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonization by a clique [Hausa-Fulani Muslims] of this country. (Author's emphasis) (Dawodu.com) (Onapajo, 2012). This attempt to correct a political imbalance through the major Gideon Orkar led coup was sponsored by Great Ogboru known to be a member of the Pentecostal household of God fellowship church, Ikeja. Orkar from Benue state in the middle belt and his supporters are convinced that political power and resources were denied the Christians in the south and the middle belt (Ibrahim, 1991). The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) was fingered by the Muslims to have been behind the coup (Faiola, 1998:112). The ferocity with which the Pentecostal churches began to emerge bearing the born again doctrine around the 1970s further waxed the strength of Christianity in Nigeria. And (CAN) whose primary objective is challenging the Islamic oligarchy had a stronger political base. The (CAN) was effectively funded by the Pentecostal churches having courted the bank chiefs and other wealthy businessmen into the churches by using the 'doctrine of prosperity'. (Kukah and Falola, 1996:239). This created the super-rich Pastors and plowed a lot of church money in Nigerian society (Magbadelo, 2004; BBC News, 15 June 2011). To confirm the above Mfonobong Nsehe of Forbes Magazine says, 'preaching is big business...it's almost as profitable as the oil commerce' in Nigeria (BBC News, 15 June 2011). This has bolstered the (CAN) to continue to challenge the perceived expansionist attempt of the Muslims and to

effectively push their political objectives. The (CAN) was prominently on the scene and was most audible in the 1970s and 1980s deliberations over Shari 'an at the federal level and the anxious moments of Organization of Islamic Conference imbroglio of the 1980s (Onapajo 2014). Religion therefore has been consistently manipulated by politicians to keep their jobs not only at the state but at the federal level. The above depicts the nature of what happens at the local level like Kaduna where religious organizations imbue political intolerance in their followers at the instance of the political elite. Therefore the 1981, 1982 Kaduna polytechnic Muslim Christian riots, the 1987 Kafanchan college of education Muslim/Christian students scuffle which led to a full scale ethno-religious uprising, the 1992 Zangon kataf mayhem, the 2000 Kaduna Shari'a conflict, the 2011 Kaduna state post-election violence and the recent December 2016 to February 2017 sporadic killings could all be linked to the handiwork of the elite class through the religious organizations.

Religion is said to be a salient feature of groups and an identity marker which explains discrimination and the formation of grievances in most societies. Fox (1997:5) citing the work of Gurr (1993) says 'religion is significant where it projects the distinctiveness of a group and could also guide the groups' social and political aspirations. (Fox & Sandler, 2003:568). Differential interests and goals by the minority and majority groups like the Shari'a in Kaduna 2000 may induce discrimination against especially the minority as they are deemed to be the subordinate group (Fox, 2001) or where the balance of power is in their disfavor can lead to rebellion, sabotage, and even violent insurrection (Gurr, 1989).

Religious institutions come into the fray where it is figured that the survival of religion is threatened or the adherents of a religion are perceived to be discriminated against. Religious bodies under the circumstances mobilize groups to protest or rebel (Fox, 1999:135). It is more effective where there is a complimentary support from the religious doctrine of violence to protect its core interests (Fox & Sandler, 2003:566). In a study by Juergensmeyer (2003) he shows how popular modern religions are strongly associated with violent situations.

Religion is also reckoned to be the most veritable tool for political mobilization. Fox and Sandler (2003:567-568) have given six different reasons to justify their position. One, it is difficult to mitigate religious activities in a state, two, The media often promote the activities of religious bodies, three, religious organizations tend to act as umbrella organizations that can effectively bring into the fold splinter groups in the society, four, they have well-established forum to hold political discussions; five, religious organizations are often strong in weak states, and six, religious organizations maintain a well-established international connection in addition to global fraternity (Onapajo,2012).

In line with the above, the legionnaires of religious antagonism had a field day at the 1977/78 Shari'a debate during the constitution drafting committee (CDC) deliberations. That debate marked the beginning of open media complicity in the aggravation of religious intolerance in Nigeria. The debate was the medium used to dichotomize the Muslims and the Christians. Some intellectuals accessed the media to misinform and pit groups against each other without scruples. The same scenario played out in Kaduna in 2000 leading to loss of lives and property.

Therefore, the 1966 military coup which is reckoned to have been religiously motivated, the major Gideon Orker coup believed to have been sponsored by a member of the pentecostal household of God fellowship Ikeja, the funding of CAN by pentecostal churches to consistently challenge the Islamic oligarchy and project their political objectives, the boisterous presence of the CAN during the 1970s and 1980s Shari'a debate at the national level, the consistent promotion of activities of religious bodies by the media, the introduction of the Shari'a legal system, the Islamic expansionism otherwise called "Islamization" of Nigeria by the media and the membership of the Organization of the Islamic conference (OIC) all contributed to dichotomize the communities into intolerant groups opposed to the religious beliefs of each other which portends danger for ethno-religious harmony. A miniaturized version of what is presented above is what obtains in Kaduna state. The political significance of Kaduna in the nation is what makes the Muslim and Christian communities covet the control of Kaduna.

#### **7.5 The Influence of History and Culture, on Ethno-religious Conflicts.**

Kazah-Toure (2003:33) identifies conflict in precolonial times between small polities in southern Kaduna and the emirates of the Sokoto caliphate, slave raids being the major form. There was also mutual trade, as the current southern Kaduna was a link to the southern parts of Nigeria. When the British incorporated the ruling elites of the emirates into the colonial state and established Anglo-Fulani hegemony, the non-Muslim peoples of the area to the south of the emirates began to be perceived as inferior, according to Yusufu Turaki (1982, as referred to by Kukah 1993:3). At independence (1960), this trend took the form of a Hausa-Fulani hegemony which, according to Kukah (1993:1), based its legitimacy on political



aspirations for Islam. This political domination with an ethnic character is claimed by Kazah-Toure (1999:139) to have triggered ethnically based resistance (Angerbrandt, 2015)

In her proposition on social justice; the central norm of Fraser's idea of identity and recognition is equality in participation. According to her conception of justice, social organizations must be in such a way that members of society interact as peers. To attain this, there must be free and equal access to the resources of society; and that, there should be no social segregation on account of any form of differences (race, ethnicity, gender, religion); every member of society must be equally opportune to attain social esteem. The two conditions are indispensable. The first condition is associated with the theory of distributive justice that is pertaining to social relations of production. The second condition has to do with social recognition; particularly the cultural interpretation of social status. This explains the unsettled idea of justice pertaining to participatory parity.

The third issue is whether what distinguishes individuals and groups should be of primary focus or our common humanity? This needs a logical approach to decipher the form of recognition justice in question. Individuals and groups may differ in their demand for justice in respect of a particular misrecognition. It all depends on the type of misrecognition reported to enable them gain participatory parity. In other words, some groups may want to rid themselves of an over ascribed or culturally defined distinctiveness while others may want some of their unrecognized distinct characteristics to be acknowledged. Yet others may want to disabuse the idea of the universality of the distinctiveness of the advantaged groups. They may otherwise

want to review the definition of the attributes they are associated with. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the above, together with redistribution. Recognition therefore depends on the people and the nature of contextual difficulties they encounter pertaining to participatory parity. (Fraser, 1998).

It is the need to be recognized as distinct that is driving the agitations of the Christian groups in southern Kaduna to demand autonomy from the Zazzau emirate. The recent democratization process in Nigeria has brought to the fore the deep resentment of the actual or perceived domination of the minority ethnic groups in Kaduna. The cultural polarity of the two communities in the state and the unrelenting agitation for autonomy from Zazzau emirate by the southern Kaduna ethnic groups has led to the inadvertent creation of chiefdoms in the southern districts of Kaduna state. This move has led to a temporary lull in the frequent clashes between the indigenous tribes of southern Kaduna and the Hausa/Fulani Muslim 'settler' communities in the area. Recent events, however, has disabused the minds of optimists who believe they have seen the last of ethnic conflicts in the area. The new turn of events is even quicker in succession than it used to be. Suleiman (2011) project that chiefdoms are only a temporary solution, the bigger problem is how to solve the problem of the Hausa/Fulani Muslim minority indigenes of the area.

Participant 8 in the interview stated that traditional political institutions are the custodians of the cultural identity of a people and traditional religions he argues are still prevalent in southern Kaduna and these religious practices are replete with primitive rituals like magic, funeral processions, talking to spirits. Generally, they are

the customary and spiritual leaders of their communities. So where the traditional political leader is from a different faith the group's customary rights are infringed.

Ethnic identity politics originated right from the ethnic formation of political parties before and immediately after independence and the Nigerian political terrain took the shape of the regional structure of the state. Electoral behavior followed the line of ethnicity and the distribution of benefits followed regional party lines. The then president Nnamdi Azikiwe led the (NCNC) which was dominant in the eastern region; there was the action Group (AG) in the south-west led by Obafemi Awolowo and the (NPC) the Northern Peoples' Congress in Northern Nigeria which was led by Sir Ahmadu Bello. The three political parties were dominant in their respective regions and there was an intense competition for the control of the federal government. The minority groups were not influential politically as the regional powers had the majority in each region even though there were fierce competitions for their votes at elections. The regions became so monolithic that the political objectives of the majority were universal in each region.

The minority tribes were left to their own devices when the British left, their earlier fears of being subsumed by the majority were justified. Some of them were stateless in their political formations they had no prior experience of centralized government structures. The Northern minorities, for instance, sharing the common experience of Northern emirate system rule began to unite under the middle belt identity to form a separate political and ethnic identity (Diamond, 1988,:24).

It is in search of autonomy from the emirate system that the demands to split Kaduna State began to gain momentum. This gave birth to the practice of categorizing citizens as indigenes and non-indigenes and of tying citizenship rights to ethnicity. The above necessitated a major restructuring. After the Sharia crises in 2000 the traditional institutions in the state were given a major shake off the result of which was the creation of 22 chiefdoms which were long agitated for. This marked the final cultural break of the southern Kaduna community from the Zaria emirate. But instead of mitigating the conflicts, the struggle for the appointment of new chiefs to the newly created chiefdoms generated unrest (Angerbrandt, 2015)

The success achieved in the struggle for autonomy became a subject of debate, while some see the attainment of recognition as an achievement; others see the fragmentation of southern Kaduna and the eventual alienation of the newly appointed rulers by the more influential emirs as a failure. This means first class chiefs may have been created but their sphere of influence differs.

In order to attract more sympathy for their struggle therefore, they tie it with the middle belt project; a project that brings together the various ethnic groups of the middle belt who are predominantly Christian with the common belief that the Hausa/Fulani hegemony obstructs their development. Christianity creates links within the middle belt groups in order to coalesce against a perceived adversary in the region (Angerbrandt, 2015). In addition, the fiscal responsibility entrusted to the central government to distribute resources to other levels of government has to a large extent been responsible for the demand for state creation in southern Kaduna especially driven by the elites. The decentralization formula that equates states and

populations and the accepted normality of patronage politics entices groups to agitate for new state creation.

Local governments as the dispensers of certificate of indigeneity are at the center of discriminatory tendencies because they are recognized as representing the indigenes only. These are however largely under the control of Christians in southern Kaduna. The neo-customary institutions however, take the place of the local governments when it comes to territorial control as their instrumentality is weak in that respect and this reinforces the politics of identity. Geographical territory becomes associated with certain ethnic and religious identities and to identify with a particular state one has to trace his descent to a particular community thereby according neo-customary institution a pride of place in legitimating one's claims on the state. (Angerbrandt 2015).

The modernists argue that vertical social mobility is possible in a modern state especially with economic modernization. But this they opine is dependent on groups' subscription to the dominant groups' culture. Where the state makes some ascribed features a requirement for upward mobility to subordinate groups, there is the likelihood of mobilizing for separate political unit especially where there is a deep pre-existing cultural disparity between the subordinate group and the dominant group (Anderson, 1983; Deutsch 1953; and Gellner, 1983). The situation in Kaduna replicates the above submission. Cultural disparity is cited as the cogent reason for the agitation for autonomy. It is hypothesized that a country should be prone to higher risk of conflict contingent on its religious and ethnic diversity. (Horowitz, 1985)

Consequent upon the above, ethnicity has been used especially by the political class to achieve selfish political goals. Bangura (as cited in Jega 2003:12), People identify with primordial groups for psychological and emotional security. There are also corresponding responsibilities associated with membership of a group (Jega 2003: 14-15). Politicians put to use this emotional tie as an underlying identity relation which is devoid of any logical rationality to edge out opponents in a contest for political power. The identity he posits is not static it changes according to the exigencies of the time. In fact, (Pye as cited in Jega, 2003:15) notes that 'identity is a matter of common interest, as such; group members collaborate to attain their objective. Jega (2003:15) notes that the pervasiveness of identity on human personality is a critical issue that is subjected to intellectual discourse.

The politics of identity is in most cases associated with agitations, mobilization, and provocation as these create some form of solidarity situation and promotes identity consciousness. Groups' mobilization and manipulation in the quest for political power has been the lot of Nigeria. The apathy of the state in terms of the welfare and feelings of the populace has been responsible for the success of this manipulation. Nnoli (1978); Ake (1996); Jega (2003:15) note that resource allocation tends to revolve around common interests based on socio-cultural identity. Identity politics, therefore, is the struggle for material resources by distinct groups who share common interests (Joseph as cited in Jega 2003:15). The ruling class and the members of the ethnic or religious groups tend to benefit from identity politics that is why it is unchecked. The politicians attain their position of power through the communal groups as their political base while the masses get easy access to state resources

through government patronage where a member of their group captures power. (Nnolil 1978; Ake 1996; Obianyo 2001; Jega 2003).

It is no surprise therefore for communities to organize parties to welcome a member of their in-group either elected or appointed to positions of authority in the process reminding him of the requirement to serve the interest of the group to which he identifies. Joseph (1999:67) termed this practice as 'prebendalism' which he defines as the appropriation of public offices by appointed or elected officers and recognized as normative and therefore legitimate. This action is not termed as an act of individual greed but an appeasement of the transient objectives of a sub-group of the society. (Obianyo, 2014).

The following have in no small measure given impetus to the ethnic and religious disharmony in the state: The historical antecedents before and after colonial rule, the cultural incongruity between the communities, the social exclusion limiting free social interaction, the misrecognition in terms of participatory parity and the discrimination borne by people who could not trace their descent to any indigenous community within or outside the state. These invariably are contributory factors that aggravate ethno-religious disquiet.

## **7.6 Summary of The Chapter**

The Nigerian constitution has been reengineered on a number of occasions in order to accommodate the minority interests by creating a political mechanism that will make every minority group no less a Nigerian than any of the majority. In the process many of the minority groups today constitute the majority in their political

units through the states creation. Where they are not, the federal character arrangement has given them adequate representation in government through proportionate representation as enshrined in the constitution. This mechanism has assured every Nigerian that he has the political space within which to participate in government on equal grounds. This would have in no small measure alleviated the fears of minority groups if not for the penchant of the political elites to use cultural identity to divide the community in order to maintain their positions of authority. This explains the protracted nature of social instability in Kaduna state which for a long time has defied solution.

### **7.7 Theoretical Validation**

In a plural society, many factors could be attributed to recurrent conflicts among citizens, social justice perhaps being the most important as proposed by the structural conflict theory. On account of the current wave of violence permeating the Northern Nigeria, a number of researches have been conducted to understand the issues behind the intractable conflict situation despite democratization (Angerbrandt, 2015; Awoniyi, 2013; Zungdet, 2014; Okafor, 2013; Suleiman, 2011; Ibrahim & Kazh-Toure, 2013). However, there is a rare focus on the level of political culture of the people as Nigeria is a new democracy. This brings our attention to the combination of the structural theory of conflict and the psycho-cultural theory.

The basic assumptions of the structural conflict theory are that social conflict is the outcome of economic and political marginalization, inequity, injustice, exploitation and poverty. Ross (1993:4) argues that where one group monopolizes the socio-economic and political processes of society, it is a strong invitation to serious fallout.



Going by in-depth interviews of participants conducted there is the belief that political corruption, marginalization, discrimination and nepotism are some of the most important triggers of ethno-religious conflicts as such it validates the structural conflict theory. This is supported by Diamond's belief that conflicts in post-colonial Nigeria were generated as a result of the emergence of a political class that translated political power as the opportunity to corner the vast resources of the state for themselves (Diamond, 1988).

Furthermore the structural theorists believe that factors such as economic and social, political and institutional as well as ethnic (demographic and geographic) who exert pressure on the people's settlement and resources account for most social conflicts. This is in agreement with the settler-indigene debacle in Northern Nigeria and particularly in Kaduna state. It is the result of the agitations for the creation of new states in the region.

While the structural theory of conflict explains the redistributive aspects of social justice, the psycho-cultural theory focuses on the recognition paradigm. The major assumptions of the theory are that; discrimination based on identity and the deprivation of the attainment of certain basic human needs like security, self-actualization and self-esteem, economic and political empowerment leads to conflicts and that; the experience of oppression, victimization, humiliation and a feeling of inferiority induces vengeance which leads to violent conflict. These propositions explain to a large extent the protracted conflict we see in Nigeria today. The immutable nature of cultural diversity makes it non-negotiable when compared to political and economic ones. (Huntington, 1993)

The above are issues that revolve around cultural identity. Ross (1993) believes that identity is the salient feature of ethnicity on which conflicts ensue. Crighton (1991) in line with Ross also posits that conflicts become long drawn especially where it is identity driven. Northrup (1989) also posits that identity gives one a sense of self-worth. One finds a feeling of physical, psychological, social and spiritual safety in identity. As such the continuous agitations for creation of chiefdoms in southern Kaduna, the exclusion of the minority Muslim groups in the region, the demand for the creation of new state, the attempt to identify with the middle belt (a region predominantly Christian with a common cultural identity) in politics and religion by the southern Kaduna Christian groups all point to the tendency to view things in a selective way because of the historical power relations between the Christian communities in southern Kaduna and the Muslims in the North. But Huntington sees it as an 'us' vs 'them' relation since the identity of a people is defined relative to their ethnic and religious backgrounds. (Huntington,1993).

### **7.8 Theoretical Contributions**

Ethno-religious conflicts have been a serious challenge in Nigeria which elicited the interest of scholars in the field. Different perspectives have been applied to explore reasons for its recurrence. The structural perspective though not discounted has nevertheless not been adequate in explaining conflicts, which is what encouraged the study to combine it with the psycho-cultural perspective in order to give a wider coverage of the field.

Most assumptions of the structural theory of conflict views conflict from the materialist conception of reality, but like Huntington (1993) argues conflicts in the

modern world are no longer generated by ideological or economic issues, rather major differences among human kind and the most leading source of conflict will be cultural. In order to compliment the structural theory therefore the psycho-cultural theory was adopted to broaden the perspective of the study.

### **7.9 Practical Contributions**

As at the time of writing this research report there are media reports of skirmishes in southern Kaduna spanning about four months October 2016 to February, 2017, the most important thing is the crises are on and that serious attention has become necessary in order to stem the tide of the crises. This study therefore is an update to the policy makers on a further dimension to view the problem that could aid the resolution of the endemic crises. It is also an important contribution to educators and other students of social conflicts to avail themselves of the literature and findings.

### **7.10 Limitations**

In every research activity there are unexpected pitfalls which one will not have planned against. This study was incidentally conducted when tensions were beginning to build up and government was doing everything possible to defuse it. Understandably citizens were wary of people asking to be granted interviews especially on a topic of such volatility.

### **7.11 Conclusions**

A lot of literature has been and is still being produced by scholars associating the failure of democracy and by extension the causes of ethnoreligious conflicts to the domineering attitude of the elites from the three major tribes in Nigeria (the Yoruba,

Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani). The most vocal critics are from the middle belt who are bitter about the misrule of the Hausa/Fulani. On account of the stranglehold of the Hausa/Fulani, the minority tribes cry the lack of access to political power and by implication state resources in addition to the constant threat of Islamization. What is noteworthy however is that the capacity of the hegemons to dominate has been gradually eroded with the ever increasing balkanization of the country into many states right from 1967 in the process of which many minority groups have been made into majority now loading it over other marginal minorities. Elites from the new majorities are now in the race for power with other majorities aligning as they go with any of the majorities with whom they seem to have better chances of capturing power. The seeming involvement of tribes that are far from the flash points of conflicts seem to suggest that the fourth force suggested by Lergo (2011:91) is germinating with the active support of one of the majority tribes who seem to have lost out in the recent power race.

Easy access to societal resources has made the economy inefficient as everybody is thinking of how to cultivate a relationship with those in power to enjoy the largesse linked to public office. Labor has been greatly devalued as the government is likened to a distributive agency. This accounts for the intense competition for power by whatever means including the killing of innocent lives, displacement of people and destruction of property.

The weak state structure and the weak judicial system make it possible for public officers to abdicate on their responsibility with impunity. Scores of lives have been lost to the selfish interest of politicians as well as ethnic and religious bigots over

decades because except on one occasion whose trial was heavily influenced by politics, no one was ever held accountable for the mass murder of citizens.

Before the carve out of Katsina state from Kaduna, the population of Katsina and northern Kaduna who were Hausa/Fulani Muslims made the population of southern Kaduna so insignificant to demand any political restructuring concerning power relations. Following the creation of Katsina state, however, the southern Kaduna minority tribes despite their disparate nature consolidated into one community for strategic reasons. Their population is now significant enough to afford the possibility of contesting for political offices. The absence of Katsina has brought them closer to political power and authority and by implication closer to the source of wealth. This possibility has however been denied them because the Northern Kaduna Hausa/Fulani population is still sizable enough to thwart their aspirations.

The impact of two major issues which were Religion and Ethnicity have to a large extent been responsible for their failure. Positions of authority have been shared according to the constitutional provisioning of proportionality, but which is sometimes heavily influenced by ethnic and religious affiliations. This has always strengthened the resolve of the southern minority tribes, to always checkmate, challenge and frustrate every program floated by the government Faleti (2006), especially that which does not benefit them, for instance, the enthronelement of Islamic Sharia in the state. This is in spite of the fact that the six other states in the zone have floated Sharia without problems. This perhaps is understandable because of the population configuration of the state. While the other six are overwhelmingly Hausa/Fulani Muslims, Kaduna state has a significant population of ethnic minority

Christians, who for historical, cultural and political reasons never tread the same path with their coexisting Muslim Community.

From the political perspective, the socio-political arrangement within the state puts one group out of the political arithmetic. The southern Kaduna people have no prospect of getting a shot at power because of their numerical inferiority and the potency of ethnoreligious manipulations. Their continuous agitations for the creation of a new state did not yield any results yet. Gurr (1989) argues that the frustration of the minority where the balance of power is in their disfavor can lead to rebellion, sabotage, and even violent insurrection.

From the socio-economic viewpoint, the cry of marginalization echoes throughout the state, because most of the infrastructure, amenities, industries that provide employment opportunities are located in Kaduna the capital city which is why the North and South want Kaduna to be part of their new state and Kaduna is indivisible (Angerbrandt, 2015). A Greater percentage of people from southern Kaduna are government employees; Federal, State and Local Government, while most business and productive activities are controlled by the Hausa/Fulani. Their differential orientation to productive activities and achievement orientation is apparent which accounts for the wide margin of income that sets the two communities apart. McClelland (1961) nAch theories posit that the performance and motivation of an individual or even a society depend on how strong one's need for achievement is. In his analogy with societies he says, there is a positive correlation between the development of a society to its achievement motivation. The southern Kaduna people have had an early start in western education Kukah (1993) as such they prefer the

comfort of offices than the uncertain environment of business or any other productive activity.

The principle of proportionality has not precluded the southern Kaduna people from effective participation in governance but they occupy a weak position owing to their numerical inferiority because Nigeria practices a majoritarian democracy. Therefore at the socio-economic level, they are outdone since most economic activities are controlled by the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. In the political arena, their chances of controlling power are effectively checked by the majority and there is no constitutional provision for rotation of offices among the various ethnic groups, but for political expediency, they are always allocated the office of the deputy governor.

The mutual social and political exclusion which promotes ethnocentric tendencies prepares grounds for tensions within the state. So generally the poverty and frustrations of one group which is blamed on the other, leads to despair and tension so that any of the trigger factors can ignite civil strife. What makes the situation more serious is, there doesn't seem to be a workable solution within the foreseeable future. To understand these complexities requires deeper attention to the impact of religious diversity and to the institutional characteristics that can foster peace as well as the conflict in religiously plural societies

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## APPENDIX

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Let's talk about the influence of ethnicity on social justice in Kaduna state
2. Would you say ethnicity impacts on political tolerance in Kaduna state?
3. Please describe how religion influences politics and political tolerance in Kaduna state?
4. Is the history and culture of the people of any significant impact on their democratic behavior?
5. How popular is the idea of mutual coexistence among the people of Kaduna state?



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